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Introducing a Haunting God: Between the Cross and Emmaus 
“We tell ourselves stories in order to live” (Didion 11) 
Christians tell their stories in relation to their understanding of God; these stories 
are theologies, theistic worldviews. As these stories differ, as different Christian sects 
“recall, at least in rough outline, the point[s] from which they [take] their departure” from 
other sects, their stories create us/them binaries (Halbwachs 85). Under the umbrella of 
“Christian,” these binaries become forms of the orthodox/heretic dichotomy. 
Within these polemic identities, Christians look dimly, as if in a mirror, at 
themselves and the Christian others, faced with issues of doctrinal diversity. Given the 
diversity of Christian belief and expression, how can we live with each other? How can 
we act, believe, and worship together in the shadow of the divisive permutations of the 
orthodox/heretic binary?1 These questions cannot be answered for every asker, but this 
text will address these questions from a philosophical and theological position and read 
cultural texts of the past and present. Ultimately, the orthodox/heretic binary 
deconstructs, because identity deconstructs. Although this deconstruction yields no 
“right” belief that applies to all peoples, at all times, and concerns all matters of 
existence—no true orthodoxy—it allows a peek at the kingdom of God, a place where 
people crucify their identities in the imitatio Christi and become a communion of saints 
who attempt to carry the imago Dei. 
 
 
                                                        
1
 On this need to act, Derrida says, “reflection upon the Latin noun ‘religion’ will no 
longer be held for an academic exercise, a philological embellishment or an etymological 
luxury: in short, for an alibi destined to suspend judgement [sic] or decision, at best for 
another epoché” (“Faith and Knowledge” 64). 
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Entering the Conversation: A Literature Review of Deconstruction and Theology 
Deconstruction has met mixed reviews in Christian circles, which places this text 
in a controversial setting amidst and between the discourses of Christian theology and 
deconstruction. Ronald Michener describes deconstruction as an attempt “to put the 
discipline of philosophy in its rightful place—simply one of many disciplines, not the 
ultimate guardian of all” (47). Deconstruction dethrones philosophy in secular areas and 
dethrones theology in religious circles. Philosophies and theologies are ways to “organize 
the shifting phantasmagoria” of stories we experience—our worldviews (Didion 11). 
Deconstruction recognizes the impotence of “those narratives which hold a legitimizing 
function,” whereas micronarratives can still carry truth (Michener 53). 
Many theologians see deconstruction resulting in nihilism, despondent 
meaninglessness, and nonsensicalness (cf. Erickson 55-56, 170; Griffin 30 McGrath 74-
75; Michener 71; Peters 20). However, even some of these thinkers do not completely 
dismiss deconstruction. Although Michener does not approve of deconstruction, he 
advocates appropriating it, explaining, “by 'appropriation' I mean borrowing and applying 
those elements from deconstructionist thought that are pertinent to our theological 
concerns, while withholding our assent from those elements which are not” (197). James 
K. A. Smith follows a similar method in his book, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?: 
Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church. For Smith and Michener, 
deconstruction benefits theology as a tool they use selectively. 
Further down the spectrum of thought, theologians like Kevin Hart adopt and 
promote a postmodern theology steeped in deconstruction, or a deconstruction steeped in 
theology, depending on your interpretation. Hart uses the tool of deconstruction, but not 
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just when convenient. For Hart, deconstruction cannot touch negative theology and its 
accompanying mysticism. Hart goes so far as to say “negative theology is a form of 
deconstruction” (186).  
Charles Winquist and Mark C. Taylor represent still another theological reaction 
to deconstruction. For them, deconstruction is still a tool, but they neither place nor see 
limits on where the tool can be used. Winquist sees theology as a view that cannot really 
encounter the world and all that is in it—theology cannot rightly be a worldview. 
However, Winquist still aims at theology and worldview: “The project [of constructing a 
theology] has no closure. […] Theological constructions need the deconstruction that 
pulls them back toward the economics of force” (79). Because theology cannot account 
for all of existence and every occurrence, deconstruction continually considers the parts 
of existence hidden in the darkness. Deconstruction in theology yields a theology where 
“theology oscillates between constructive and deconstructive possibilities” (103). 
Following a different path, Mark C. Taylor sees Winquist’s oscillation, but cannot 
see theology oscillating only within itself. Although Winquist rightfully embraces 
deconstruction, he still softens the blow when it comes to the theological enterprise. 
Taylor does not; he calls his work Erring: A Postmodern A/theology—not exactly 
theology, not exactly not-theology (10). Perhaps Taylor’s work is closer to saying 
“theology,” which is theology sous rature, or theology under erasure. Derrida borrowed 
this practice from Heidegger in searching for a way to express how inappropriately a 
word conveys meaning, but how necessary it is for communication, even if it misses the 
mark (Powell 47). Taylor integrates deconstruction with traditionally Christian images 
and highly influence this paper and its vocabulary with his compelling interpretations of 
Simmons 4 
 
the interweaving network of theology and deconstruction (for simplicity, I only use sous 
rature to emphasize the insufficiency of language). 
Taylor argues for the deconstruction of God, self, history, and the book. In 
deconstructing, these things have given birth to something new. God dies, history ends, 
the self disappears, and the book undergoes closure” (Taylor 7-8). As a result of this 
deconstruction an “a/theological network” rises (Taylor 8). This network embraces God 
as writing, as “the interplay of signs” in which there is no transcendental signified, but 
rather an endless creation of meaning and play (105-6). In place of the self, is the trace—
a person who is so interrelated to everyone else that the person includes a trace of the 
individual and traces of everyone and everything else (138; 140-1).  
History ends, because history never began. Without a beginning, there can be no 
end (155). Indeed, without selves, history cannot be told. History is a construction, not 
reality (68). What exists is erring—wandering, being wrong, sinning, and more 
wandering (72-73). Without history, the book could never have been opened or written 
by an Author-God for a people. Instead of a book, Taylor advocates for the text, “an 
endless process of multiplication, pluralization, and dispersal” (180), echoing the words 
of Derrida: “There is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 163). 
John D. Caputo takes yet another route that influences my understanding of 
deconstruction and theology. Caputo does not see deconstruction necessitating any sort of 
atheism, perhaps saying so in the face of Taylor’s proposal (“Prayers and Tears” 4). 
Instead, Caputo says: "In the view I am advancing here, deconstruction is treated as the 
hermeneutics of the kingdom of God, as an interpretive style that helps get at the 
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prophetic spirit of Jesus" (“WWJD?” 26, original emphasis). Like Winquist, Caputo 
understands deconstruction helps check if a view reflects reality (“WWJD?” 27).  
Surely deconstruction cannot avoid the topic of God, but neither can it make a 
ruling. Instead of necessarily saying whether or not God exists, deconstruction will tear 
down ideas and attributes of God, which serves as the reality check, what Caputo 
describes as justice. Caputo’s idea of justice follows Derrida’s and this emphasis on 
justice is where Caputo mainly differs with Winquist and Taylor.  
In an interview with Caputo, Derrida describes justice as “what gives us the 
impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. 
Without a call for justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law. That 
is why I said that the condition of possibility of deconstruction is a call for justice” 
(“Deconstruction in a Nutshell” 16). Justice sous rature is the reality behind the words 
“justice,” “law,” “God,” “self,” “history,” “book,” and “theology,” just as God is the 
possible reality behind the words “God” and “YHWH.” Justice and God need these 
words not only for deconstruction, but for any sort of existence: “Justice in itself is an 
unconditional demand, but of itself, it has no flesh and bones, no force, no teeth” 
(Caputo, “WWJD?” 63). We need language and therefore deconstruction in order to 
reach towards understanding. Without language, there is no communication and no 
thought. Without deconstruction, there is no continuation of thought towards truth and 
reality—towards God. 
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Entering the Conversation: This Piece 
This thesis reaches towards God with Caputo’s understanding of justice and 
Taylor’s understanding of identity as a trace. With these understandings, I approach the 
questions asked earlier of how to live and act with each other amidst difference. First, this 
text examines the creation of Christian identity in chapter one. This chapter reflects on a 
Bible burning by Christians to illustrate the deconstructing process of identification, 
especially as presented in Jacques Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other and popular 
Christian author Brian McLaren’s A Generous Orthodoxy. Although rooted in some good 
intentions and confidence, the binary sloshes about in a power struggle, not in 
“correctness” or love. This power struggle for identity is alive and dangerous, evinced in 
the Bible burning. This struggle is also ancient and modern, as will be seen in the 325 CE 
Council of Nicaea and theological battles over William Paul Young’s The Shack. 
Presented with the identification in the Bible burning, chapter one firmly places 
Christians within the deconstructing us/them structure of orthodox/heretic and addresses 
the issues of how to live with this deconstructing binary inside and outside of Christian 
communities: the communion of saints and justice. Observing deconstruction and moving 
beyond the binary, oppressive alterity dissipates and the sects that were once polemically 
separated can come together, beginning to reach towards the impossible: correct belief 
and the kingdom of God. Only together can communities attempt right beliefs, for they 
need to consider the experience of the Other and result in a mutual benefit of all sides. 
Only together and in deconstruction can theology have a proper future. 
History is consulted to see this deconstruction at a distance. Chapter two 
investigates the 325 CE Council of Nicaea, prototype for the orthodox/heretic binary of 
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Christian identification. The binary deconstructs in the mytho-historical data of the 
council, in the events of and surrounding the council. This deconstruction includes the 
creed produced at the council, specifically around the use of the word “anathema.” 
Chapter 3 will proceed on a similar path as chapter 2, but looking at The Shack. 
Since the novel became a bestseller, it has been the subject of much argument and name-
calling, especially the names orthodoxy and heresy. After seeing deconstruction in the 
name-calling, the play of special/normal will be examined. 
Chapter 4 grasps towards what theology and deconstruction are opening. With 
orthodoxy/heresy continually deconstructing, the binary points towards the play of 
theory/practice. When people stop obsessing about the boundaries of identity, they are 
free to engage in identification with each other, amiably working to develop the self in 
regards to theory and practice. Both “us” and “them” crucify their identities only to arise 
as something similar, but other—a resurrected, hauntological trace continually on the 
way to the cross and the resurrected presence/absence of the ghostlike Jesus on the way 
to Emmaus (Luke 24:13-35).2 
The “them” of us/them are no longer heretics or pagans, but rather siblings and 
friends. Together, we are motivated towards theology, deconstruction, and God—love, 
justice, and peace amidst the aporia of thinking and acting. We can choose theory and 
action, or neither theory nor action—we can choose to go beyond the tension of the two 
to the opening up of another possibility: the kingdom of God descending onto the city of 
humanity and the city of humanity ascending into the kingdom of God.
                                                        
2
 A Derridaean neologism, “hauntological” connotes the différance and play between 
presence and absence, Hauntology is not concerned with existence, but rather with the 
inescapable need to acknowledge a thing (“Specters” 35, 177n1, 177n2, translator’s 
note). On the concept of the self as a trace, see Mark C. Taylor 13, 34-51. 
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Chapter 1: Crucifying Identity 
“Where books are burned, in the end people will be burned” (Heine, qtd. in “Library”). 
“Where the mountains kiss the sky,” a small group of Christians gathered to eat 
“fried chicken and all the sides,” and burn books. However, due to state laws and rain, the 
book burning turned into a book tearing (“Canton, NC”; Grizzard, “Book Burning 2009,” 
respectively). These Christians are from a self-proclaimed “independent, fundamental 
Baptist church” and they placed some unexpected items on their list for burning. At the 
top of list, Pastor Grizzard wrote on his website: “We are burning Satan’s bibles like the 
NIV, RSV, NKJV, TLB, NASB, ESV, NEW, NRSV, ASV, NWT, Good News for 
Modern Man, The Evidence Bible, The Message Bible, The Green Bible, and ect. These 
are perversions of God’s Word the King James Bible [sic]” (“Book Burning 2009”). 
Beliefs are the issue for the people at this church. Grizzard cites Ronald Reagan 
and others who praised the beauty of the King James’ Version of the Bible, thinking the 
Bible deserves the “high” language of 1611 in order to be read and heard in English. The 
issue is not just beauty, however. Grizzard repeatedly throws the word “perversion” and 
quotes a myriad of persons who claim the KJV is an inspired version of the Bible for 
English speakers (“Preversions”; “King James Version 1611”). Speaking for his church, 
Grizzard approves of some earlier English translations of the Bible as well, translations 
based on the textus receptus, and the textus receptus itself (“Book Burning 2009). 
Translation has little to do with the contents of the Bible, though. Grizzard is not 
basing his beliefs about the KJV in the Bible, since the Bible says absolutely nothing 
about textual criticism, which manuscripts are the most reliable, or who is the most 
authorized to translate from those manuscripts. Grizzard and other “KJV Only” 
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Christians are concerned with their belief in the preservation and perversion of God’s 
words (“King James Version 1611”). Their beliefs are grounded completely in faith, not 
the Bible, which I am not judging as a poor position necessarily. 
Rather, we see the congregation’s beliefs for what they are: faith. And we see this 
church in Canton is a canton: set aside from much of the world and many Christians for 
political purposes, for purposes of delineation, for purposes of defining doctrine along the 
line of correct and incorrect, or orthodoxy and heresy, to use proper theological terms. 
Their doctrines are portrayed with a particular cant on who is and who is not right, 
canting away from anyone who says anything with which they do not agree by burning—
or tearing, rather—the works of those who disagree with their orthodoxy. 
Through their polemic beliefs, this Amazing Grace Baptist Church creates a rigid 
identity on which to rest their beliefs. They base the beliefs on the idea of orthodoxy, 
although they might not describe themselves in this way. These sorts of sects can start in 
various communities, Christian or not, and many of them start small like the church in 
Canton. Christians especially often create sectarian communities for evolving differences, 
whether the differences are positive situations where separatists break off for what “we 
believe” or negative situations where a group is exiled, excommunicated, or excluded for 
what “they believe.” In either separation, the communities created find the identities 
steeped in a deconstructing, us/them alterity. 
Identity naturally grows upon us/them alterities; for Christians, it stems especially 
from the orthodox/heretic binary. Christians build upon their identities with language, 
like all identities. Pastor Grizzard appends language like “Independent King James Bible 
Believing [sic]” onto the word “church” (Amazing Grace Baptist Church). By using the 
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word “independent,” the church separates itself from any denominational community of 
Baptist churches, the word “Baptist” connoting Protestant and practicing immersion 
baptism of adults, not infants. The church continues to identify itself as different from 
others when it touts “King James Bible Believing,” which, grammatically, could connote 
either using the King James Version and believing in the Bible or believing in the King 
James Version of the Bible. Either way, the group sets itself as “not them” with its 
bricolage of amendments on the word “church”  
With all this Christian jargon, these identifiers approach meaningless. Many 
Christians use the phrase “Bible Believing” without believing the same things about the 
Bible. And although “independent,” the church is still a community that believes it is part 
of a larger community, evinced in the many links and people to whom the refer on their 
website. In reaching for precision, they find as much ambiguity as the word “Christian” 
and the word “human,” for “an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the 
interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic [sic] process of identification endures” 
(Derrida, Monolingualism 28). Before one can even say “Christian,” one must say “I” in 
some language. Before one can say “I,” one must experience “I.” Before one can 
experience “I,” one must have the sense of “I,” which is an identity and identity is a 
construct of language. The “I” has no originary event and identity becomes lost in 
différance, leaving humans only with the process of identification (Derrida, 
Monolingualism 29). 
Members of Amazing Grace Baptist Church can associate themselves with each 
other, independently a community within a community and Baptists different from, but 
similar to other Baptists; however, in using words to demonstrate difference, they 
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emphasize their similarities. As they say “independent,” they attempt to repress their 
dependence. Yet, they reflect their dependence when they rely on the concepts those 
words mean to them and other dis-like them. By saying “I am,” one attempts to repress 
other “I am” possibilities with an implicit “I am not” (Derrida, Monolingualism 31). 
This repression comes from the language one inherits, but not just language in the 
sense of French, English, or German, but rather Christian religious language in any 
dialect. To be Christian is to be an inheritor of Christian religious language, inheriting 
knowledge that independent Baptists are a communities without denominational 
community, but also communities resisting community, simultaneously “I am” and “I am 
not.” They accept the repression, accept the “imposing and legitimating appellations” of 
Christian identity by saying “I am …” (Derrida, Monolingualism 39). 
1.1. Christian Identity as Orthodoxy/Heresy and the Deconstruction Thereof 
Within and behind these Christian appellations, stands the powerful 
orthodox/heretic binary stemming back towards and past the 325 CE Council of Nicaea 
and as recent and popular as the din surrounding William Paul Young’s The Shack: “The 
word orthodoxy […] is often one of the prime weapons of exclusion, conjuring 
inquisitions and throwing around damning labels like heretic and infidel” (McLaren 279). 
McLaren disguises the binary and Grizzard highlights it as he oppresses through 
destroying the words of the theological Other, pushing them to the disapproved side of 
the binary. Others oppress through avenues of power in first naming and then separating, 
creating sects by withdrawing and excluding. 
When Grizzard, the Council of Nicaea, Young, and Young’s critics use the 
orthodoxy/heresy language, they use a language “whose essence is always colonial, 
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which tends, repressively and irrepressibly, to reduce language to the One, that is, to the 
hegemony of the homogenous,” to completely snuff out the heretic, to remove the 
us/them binary by getting rid of “them” (Derrida, Monolingualsm 39-40). At the Council 
of Nicaea, power was exerted through excommunication and by empowering leaders who 
supported the ideals of orthodoxy in doctrine. Surrounding The Shack, Young touts 
himself as orthodox, while critics like Albert Mohler, president of Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, and former counsel member to President Nixon and current 
popular Christian author, Chuck Colson, think the whole book is heretical rubbish. 
In the suppressing and oppressing surrounding Amazing Grace Baptist Church, 
Nicaea, The Shack, and other identification events, the orthodox become un-orthodox. 
When identity forms lines of orthodoxy/heresy, it necessarily turns from knowing oneself 
to oppression and becomes a matter of perspective and power, not a matter of correct 
belief. Orthodoxy is defined by those in power in a community or sect, not necessarily 
those who are right. 
Christian historian Walter Bauer exposes the issues of perspective and power in 
his Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity. He argues that orthodoxy and heresy 
developed from each other in different locations. In some locations, what eventually 
became orthodoxy and heresy existed nearly harmoniously until leadership moved from 
cooperative councils to single authorities and rigid hierarchies including bishops, popes, 
and emperors. Whether the majority or minority view, the person who obtains leadership 
moved from an I/them to an us/them by incorporating his followers into his idea of 
right/wrong belief, eventually naming heretical what were the dominant and original 
beliefs of some geographic locations.  
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When singularity was not achieved in the community, suppression and oppression 
moved towards exile, the orthodoxy established by the authority “either obliges others to 
adapt themselves to its dominant representations, or it systematically ignores them […] 
relegat[ing] them to an inferior rank” (Halbwachs” 92). When the oppressed are exiled, 
the heretics go out of the community and sometimes establish their beliefs as orthodox in 
their new home. When orthodoxy equates to dominant, it moves away from its 
etymological root of “right belief” to being an issue of perspective, to being “what we 
believe.”  
Chesterton exemplifies this derision of the meaning of orthodoxy when he talks 
about his opinions of Rudyard Kipling and George Bernard Shaw: “I am concerned with 
him [Kipling] as a Heretic—that is to say, a man whose view of things has the hardihood 
to differ from mine. [...] I am concerned with him [Shaw] as a Heretic—that is to say, a 
man whose philosophy is quite solid, quite coherent, and quite wrong,” and again, “It 
may be true that the thing in Mr. Shaw most interesting to me, is the fact that Mr. Shaw is 
wrong. But it is equally true that the thing in Mr. Shaw most interesting to himself is the 
fact that Mr. Shaw is right” (15, 290, respectively).  
Orthodoxy/heresy is a deconstructing matter of perspective and power, whether it 
(re)appears amidst pre-Nicene Christian and proto-Christian communities or communities 
defining themselves in a post-Nicene, postmodern world amidst didactic novels and 
cantons. After the Council of Nicaea, some of the “heretics” were later restored into 
community for the same reason they were excommunicated: politics, not belief. In 325 
CE, the orthodox rooted their perspective of orthodoxy/heresy in belief and usefulness for 
the church and empire. Today, the perspective is much the same. Christians like Albert 
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Mohler and Chuck Colson have a livelihood supported by people who metaphorically 
buy what they say and literally buy what they produce. Mohler and Colson believe they 
are right, just like the fourth-century Alexander and Constantine did. But just like 
Alexander and Constantine, Mohler and Colson have a following to lead and keep. 
Although Young exhibits more fidelity to his theological others, he inherits their 
language and tries to reverse the binary, playing the power game with them like 
Athanasius did at Nicaea. 
The us/them binaries deconstruct precisely because of the changing definition 
based on perspective and power. Although these binaries stand in front of struggles for 
power and identity, beyond them, in fields of deconstruction, lies a possible community 
where every theological other gives and receives blessings, mutual blessings. When 
embodying their deconstruction, especially the deconstruction of identity, the individual 
becomes a trace in “The absence of a stable model of identification for an ego” (Derrida, 
“Monolingualism” 60, original emphasis; cf. Taylor, especially chapter 2 and 6). The “I” 
might use descriptive words like “orthodox” and “heretic,” but not to stereotype or 
homogenize the whole person, but rather to evoke similarities between traces of the 
connotations of each of those identities.  
These evocations never stop at identifiers, but always continue to explain until the 
identifiers approach an abundance of meaning and, as a consequence, meaninglessness.3 
“Independent King James Bible Believing” says a lot about Amazing Grace Baptist 
Church, but deconstructs, as aforementioned. Pastor Grizzard recognizes this 
                                                        
3
 See Derrida, “Monolingualism” 60 for the references to stereotyping and homogenizing. 
See also page 66 on the utility of the identification process, what Derrida calls an “idiom 
[that] makes things happens” (his emphasis). I owe the connection of abundant meaning 
with meaninglessness to Bosch (511). 
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deconstruction as he sees the necessity to have a page of their website dedicated to 
continuing the process of identification. Their “What We Believe” page shows how 
identity is more than identifiers, it is a never-ending process of identification. Grizzard’s 
epithet for the church again deconstructs as he cannot simply call the church 
“Independent King James Bible Believing” or juxtapose its positions to that of heretics, 
he must continue identifying (cf. Grizzard, “Heretics to Avoid”). 
In continuing the process of identification, the community or person attempting to 
construct an identity becomes a trace of the words spoken. As Grizzard updates his 
website, he meets contention from those who do not understand his identity the way he 
does. In response to this gaze, he writes more words. As the words “orthodox” and 
“heretic” may be tossed about between Grizzard and his contenders, the division between 
the words is rent in two like the curtain of the temple in the passion narratives. This 
splitting leaves only a trace of both in the confluence of both, forcing the “I” to move on 
and search for more ways to experience identification, more ways to remember the self 
and the self’s community that are more than one or the other and more than an attempt at 
a mythical golden mean.  
For Grizzard, that means another book burning, joining with another church, 
despite their “independent” status (“Book Burning 2010”). The 2010 book burning will 
be similar to the 2009 event, but even in its attempt at continuity and tradition, it makes 
new statements that supersede the old ones, making a different identity than the previous 
year’s. And the process will continue, perhaps with a 2011 burning of books, an effigy of 
a past identities in an attempt at keeping a consistent, orthodox identity. These continued 
efforts in identification become anamneses that are not only memory and hauntology, but 
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also actively and religiously reflecting and remembering the Eucharistic anamnesis of the 
suffering, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ in the continual death and rebirth of 
identity in its deconstruction, of the différance of identification (“Anamnesis”).4 
However, without recognizing this deconstruction, the Amazing Grace Baptist 
Church will continually try to retain the orthodoxy/heresy line. It is not until the church 
recognizes and embraces the deconstruction of identity that they can step towards and 
beyond the goal of orthodoxy: right belief and rightness in general, including belief and 
action.5 “Right belief” must justly represent the one and the other, must be “an anamnesis 
of the entirely other,” must be Eucharist (Derrida, “Monolingualism” 60). Without a true 
communion of saints, or communion period, without including the experience and 
memory of the Other, of all others, and of the entirely other, then orthodoxy falls subject 
to a “hole in [the] gospel,” to borrow a phrase from journalist James Pedrick. When 
orthodoxy represses the memory and experience of the other—the heretic—the orthodox 
miss out on the opportunity to be “right,” whether that group is led by Grizzard, the 
homoousios group at Nicaea, Young, or Mohler. One group can reach for correctness 
only when in relationship and partnership with the Other, only when “shar[ing] the 
treasures of their heritages” at a common table (McLaren 233; cf. Ps. 23:5),6 only when 
they forsake their “safe” memory by throwing away orthodoxy for the sake of getting 
closer to orthodoxy, by losing themselves in order to find themselves, and by sharing the 
                                                        
4
 Cf. Maurice Halbwachs’ On Collective Memory. See especially chapter 6 on the 
religious collective memory, which forms communal identity, especially in doctrine, but 
also in practice. 
5
 In a similar vein, McLaren says “right thinking […] recedes, happily, farther beyond 
our grasp the more we pursue it” (336). 
6
 My colleague David Michaux brought my attention to the connection Psalm 23 with 
communing with the Other at the table and, based on the end of the Psalm, in the future 
kingdom. 
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bread of the Eucharist with everyone, even the dogs who beg at the table (Matt. 10:39; 
16:25; 15:21-28). 
Without identity, the self becomes a “trace” in a truly Christian or, rather, Jesus-
like way (Taylor 34-51). Identity and “the self [are] nailed to [the] cross,” on either side 
of Jesus the Christ, again creating a Eucharistic anamnesis (Taylor 50). Here we find a 
religious death of the author, resulting in a hauntological existence of Christ, self, and 
identity—an existence between the way of the cross and the way to Emmaus. The 
deconstruction of orthodoxy/heresy needs the deconstruction of identity and the 
deconstruction of self, which is the very imitatio and imago Dei. 
In this way, the “us” needs the “them” in order to be “us” and vice versa. Without 
“them,” the “us” cannot reach its potential, whatever it might deem its purposes. If the 
“us” wants to evangelize the world, it needs a “them” to evangelize, a them to resist 
evangelization in order to stay “them” so the “us” can still be the “us.” If the “us” wants 
to eliminate poverty, it needs an impoverished “them” to assist. If the “us” wants to have 
“correct belief,” then it needs to consider all experience, even the experience of the 
heretical “them” (McGrath 121; Selmanovic; cf. Erickson 23). Re-communion beyond 
the us/them binary is essential for continuation, for finding the future possibilities to 
which deconstruction opens us, for living and acting together in a cosmopolitan setting 
where our responsibility to each other is infinite (Derrida, “Specters” xv; 
“Cosmopolitanism” 16-17; Critchley and Kearney x; cf. Faith House Manhattan). It is 
only in this community of communities where we can listen to the voice of the Other 
instead of silencing it. The us/them binary of Christianity—orthodox/heretic—needs 
deconstruction in order for Christianity to continue faithfully. 
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1.2. Re-communion through Engaging a Deconstructed Identity 
Living with this deconstruction involves embracing the Other and cooperating 
with them—a re-communion not of “saints,” but rather of all humanity at communion 
and personal tables (if not also at the marriage supper of the lamb), as exemplarily seen in 
Faith House Manhattan, a community of persons with and without faith who live, grow, 
and serve together. 
Faith House Manhattan attempts to deconstruct the difference between any 
us/them by re-communing religious and nonreligious persons who once worried more 
about rightness and wrongness than each other. Indeed, when schisms form, both the “us” 
and the “them” believe they are right; “the most basic motivation behind every heresy 
and schism,” and the orthodox too, “is the conviction on the part of the heretics and 
schismatics that they are right and their opponents wrong” (Lee x).7 Sects and movements 
form from the difficulties and conflicts involved in having different beliefs. These 
factions must crucify their identity in order to once again achieve fellowship, be that 
identity as part of the Amazing Grace Baptist Church, a Nicene, an Arian, a supporter of 
The Shack, or, simply, “Christian.” 
With their identities crucified, the communion of saints can re-commune with 
themselves and with the Other. Us/them binaries will not be forced upon anyone, no “in-
group which w[ill] banish others to an out-group.” But rather, there will be a “come-on-in 
group, one that s[eeks] and welcome[s] everyone” (McLaren 279, original emphasis). Of 
course, not everyone will want to “come on in,” despite the invitation. But when the 
Other chooses to remain an other, the “come-on-in” invitation must not be revoked. The 
                                                        
7
 Cf. Robert Roth, who rightly says, “heresy always intends to be on the side of God” 
(117). 
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offer must stand, even when unheeded and if need be, we can follow the example of Jesus 
who, “If people rejected his acceptance, he did not retaliate against them, but submitted 
himself to humiliation, mistreatment, even crucifixion by them” (McLaren 279). 
1.3. The Kingdom: Justice, Orthodoxy/Heresy, Voiced/Voiceless and Belief/Action 
If re-communion is going to be a “come-on-in group,” then it becomes a justice 
issue deconstructing further binaries. As orthodoxy/heresy deconstructs, one sees how the 
orthodox and heretic of any time not only repress each other in their various ways, but 
also the poor and uneducated (depending on the sect). Issues of orthodoxy and heresy are 
luxuries many cannot afford when their lives depend on being uneducated and/or 
laborers. The identification arguments occur in the ranks of the empowered of most sects, 
those who have a voice and work at silencing the voices of others. 
In earliest Christianity, arguments of belief happened at the wealthy and academic 
level. Concerning the rural, uneducated, often “poor” peoples in the first three centuries 
C.E.—am ha-aretz, literally, “the people of the land”—Jones says, “Usually they accepted 
Roman or barbarian with equal apathy” to their acceptance of any “orthodox” or 
“heretical” Christian (29).8 Am ha-aretz often lacked the luxury of study and/or argument 
of belief. They would receive the law out of tradition and often do as told, at least, to a 
practical point.  
It is impossible ever to truly know how and what am ha-aretz did and thought, 
since they have passed away with their voices repressed by circumstance and people, 
                                                        
8
 “Poor” likely means something vastly different from what it did in the first three 
centuries C.E. Today we define poverty by how much money one has and makes, whereas 
many of am ha-aretz may have only seldom acquired or used any sort of money, instead 
they were “economically self-sufficient,” living entirely of the land and through trade in 
the rural area (Horsley 75, 66-87, 103). 
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leaving them unheard by most of the future. People living in hard-to-reach areas like 
mountains were about as likely to be influenced by orthodoxy and heresy as they were 
the Roman empire (Horsley 16).9 The voices of orthodoxy could barely traverse the gap 
between them and the voices of am ha-aretz.  
Even Emperor Constantine saw this gap when he wrote a letter to Alexander and 
Arius; he asked them, concerning their theological squabble, “For how very few are there 
able either accurately to comprehend, or adequately to explain subjects so sublime and 
abstruse in their nature? Or, granting that one were fully competent for this, how many 
people will he convince (Eusebius, Life of Constantine 2:69)?” In the same vein, how was 
Arius to convince the farmer to ponder the budding doctrine of the trinity as the farmer 
worries about the weather, the fields, the animals, his sick child, his pregnant wife, and 
his elderly parents instead? Did Alexander ever take time to convince the women in 
central Alexandria of homoousios, let alone the women ha-aretz? What of the slaves? 
Similarly, poverty and education are an issue surrounding the battle on The Shack. 
Christian authorities constantly sell their interpretations of the Bible and theology in a 
language easier and more pleasing to read to a certain demographic of readers. The 
leaders of denominations and popular para-church organizations send their opinions out 
on the internet, radio, or pamphlets either directly to the public or to the pastors who then 
re-package the opinion for the new am ha-eretz: the parishioner. These authorities are 
threatened when an easy-to-read, cheap, bestselling novel enters the scene, distilling a 
                                                        
9
 Although Horsley speaks specifically of Galilee in his work, his connection between 
“political geography” and “topography” is true outside of Galilee, too. There are still 
mountain and jungle villages whose inhabitants live ignorant of much modern technology 
and politics, depending on how hard their village is to reach. 
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different theology and another interpretation of the Bible for those who can understand 
modern stories more than the Bible. 
As this new perspective and oppression influences the deconstruction of 
orthodoxy/heresy, it brings to light more binaries. It is not only the orthodox and heretical 
sects who need to cooperate, but also the rich and poor, the heard and unheard, the voiced 
and voiceless of both groups. And still today this binary cries for deconstruction not 
simply in the intellectual space of doctrine, but also in the area of action and everyday 
life.10 
Orthodoxy/heresy only becomes an issue when power struggles arise and 
disagreements turn into disputes. Disagreements are novelties, whereas disputes aim to 
win and overcome the opponent who is an other. Different and contrasting beliefs can 
and do amiably exist vis-à-vis. Disputes occur in problems of existential identity and in 
struggles for power. Chesterton rightly maintains “truths turn into dogmas the instant 
they are disputed” (306). 
Therefore, the orthodoxy/heresy binary is inherently an issue of voice. Neither 
sect wants the other sect(s) to be heard. The extremists of all sects want everyone to think 
like they do, because they think they are correct and they want others to hold “correct 
belief.” Because these sects believe they hold the truth, they do not want to listen 
honestly to the voices of others, since they must be wrong.11 The voice of the Other is 
                                                        
10
 Although much is said about the belief/action binary (under various names), Yoder 
calls it “a doctrinal error. The biblical word does not distinguish what you ought to think 
and what you ought to do, or if it does so, it is in order to accentuate that the two must be 
related closely” (390). Although not ideal, the binary is real. Most of us live it, however 
unfortunate. 
11
 Brian McLaren promotes a group he thinks transcends these two options, what he calls 
a “generous orthodoxy,” taking the term from Hans Frei (McLaren 14-15). However, 
Simmons 22 
 
desired only to be silenced and melded into the hegemonic voice. The voice of the Other 
is to speak in only one language, a language that is not their own (cf. Derrida, 
“Monolingualism” 1). With this obsession for orthodoxy and silencing the Other, belief is 
hailed above action.12 It is often more important to read the King James’ Version of the 
Bible and believe it is the inspired, inerrant, infallible Word of God than to read and 
understand the words inside of it. 
But not all people in sects are preoccupied with doctrine. Many are quite focused 
on love and social justice, on lifting up the Other and deconstructing binaries, whether or 
not they realize the deconstruction they incarnate. These people are not exceptions to the 
previous descriptions, but rather deconstructors, although they may resist that language. 
They are the ones who listen to the voices of the voiceless and refuse to prefer doctrine at 
the expense of action. They deconstruct these binaries in their lives, often struggling, like 
Derrida, with the Monolingualism of the Other—that language they have inherited and 
speak, but which is not their own, that language of binaries, of orthodox/heretic, 
voiced/voiceless, and belief/action—like Faith House Manhattan. Similarly, many aim to 
deconstruct these binaries, but are merely trying to flip them or replace the orthodox 
doctrine with another orthodoxy (for example, Smith). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
McLaren must end up promoting either no orthodoxy or another orthodoxy, however 
movable the boundaries. If his generous orthodoxy is truly broad and without set limits, 
then his generous orthodoxy is no orthodoxy at all, it is simply a community of people 
with beliefs, which is what I advocate. McLaren’s terminology attracts a certain audience 
that might not otherwise reject orthodoxy and its limitations, making A Generous 
Orthodoxy a practical title, albeit an errant one that ends up being no orthodoxy at all. 
12
 It is not heresies the orthodox are trying to silence, but rather the heretics, to silence 
them and force them to conform. Conversely, those labeled heretic are often trying to 
silence the orthodox as well (Zito 125). 
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1.4. The Binaries in Time: An Overview of the Power of Interactions 
These binaries span the years from Christianity’s gradual emergence from 
Israelite religion to today. As Christianity changes, the orthodoxy/heresy binary changes 
with it. The orthodoxies of today are not the orthodoxies of yesteryears; ancient creeds 
have been supplemented, altered, and discounted by different statements of beliefs from 
the official, denominational publications and systematic theology text books to the 
organized and unorganized thoughts of the blogosphere. Similarities persist, but changes 
are inevitable.  
Likewise, the heresies of today are not the same heresies in earliest Christianity, 
despite similarities. Things change, things stay the same, but similarities and continuity 
are not lords and ladies over flux (cf. Foucault 21-22). Despite changing, orthodoxy and 
heresy conflict where people fight against each other to establish their identity and to 
honor and protect their God, all of which can be protected when you are in power. Power 
is not always sought for power’s sake, but rather to promote correct belief and good 
identity, although, money and control have always been alluring. The players in Nicaea 
and The Shack all think they are right and want others to have correct beliefs. 
We should not imagine all of Christianity’s history was “red in tooth and claw”—
or, perhaps, read in tooth and claw, superimposing a zeal for power upon those in the past 
with whom a scholar disagrees (Tennyson 56.15). In the earliest movements, some Jesus-
sects of Jewish, Gentile, or mixed composition could coexist with little trouble. The book 
of Acts depicts an issue that may have been quelled when Paul came to Jerusalem and 
defused some misunderstandings, allowing both communities in question—the Jesus-sect 
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in Antioch and that in Jerusalem—to coexist (although Peter still had difficulty accepting 
the different groups [Acts 15; Galatians 2:11-14]). 
Even as many Jesus-sects evolved into Christianity, the disputes were not 
ubiquitous, as some imagine. Randal Rauser tells a hypothetical tale of a “fierce public 
debate between orthodox Christianity and Arianism [which] so consumed the general 
public that people would jump into theological debates at the slightest provocation” (10). 
Although Rauser argues that the general milieu was engaged in the debate, a “public 
debate” can reflect a debate done in public and a debate done for the public, since the 
bishops thought they were doing a public service. Gregory of Nyssa claimed this debate 
was so important and prevalent that a person asking for change would receive a 
discussion about begotten vs. not begotten (qtd. in Rauser 10-11). Although Rauser 
quotes Gregory to further his view, the quote reflects instead how the needs of the poor 
were left unmet for the sake of a public debate. Instead of feeding the hungry and 
clothing the naked, the bishops gave them doctrines and arguments.  
These two fanciful accounts reflect not simply an orthodox way, but rather a 
privileged recount of the past, where the others are not just those who became orthodox 
or heretical, but all the poor upon whom the church stood. While obsessing over right and 
wrong beliefs, people forgot about the right actions called for by Jesus in places like 
Matthew 25:36-40. The very privileged status of these disputes again reflect how 
incomplete orthodoxy and heresy are—making them both deficient theologies as they 
ignore not only the experience of the other part of the binary and that of the poor and 
uneducated, but also the very imperatives of the Jesus whom both groups claim to follow. 
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As education has become more available, orthodoxy and heresy has taken a 
different shape. Some people—orthodox and heretic—saw the divide between the 
educated clergy and uneducated poor. For one, Jerome translated the Bible into Latin, 
what was the common language in his time. But his translation soon rose to an elevated 
status where, again, only the educated could reach it. Martin Luther is another (in)famous 
man to place the Bible in the hand of the people. Of course, the Bible was still only 
accessibly by those who could read, even if it was in the common language. Even in the 
USA today we have those who refuse to read any other translation but the Authorized 
King James Version of the Bible, which is written in a seventeenth-century, British 
English few US American (or even British) persons understand today.13 
But those who only accept the KJV are but one sect defining orthodoxy and 
heresy while struggling for power. And fortunately, not all in these sects are hungry for 
power, a hunger occurring at the top tier of education and power, a hunger that 
sometimes ends in quite scary acts, including the Halloween book burning in Canton, NC 
(Grizzard, “Book Burning 2009”).14 Indeed, we cannot even paint every person within a 
movement as struggling for power. Intentions are as polyvalent as orthodox movements. 
Intentions and movements have grown with time and access to education and 
power. Without nobility and hereditary succession, power can be held by anyone who 
makes it into the right circles, which can be anyone, as many rags-to-riches stories have 
                                                        
13
 I have only noted a few, popular milestones in those who have tried to bridge the gap 
between the Church and the Academy by translating the Bible. Other translations 
occurred and other persons made great strides to include the poor and uneducated in 
constructing their personal theology, although sometimes at the expense of the rich and 
educated. 
14
 Are these actions not more scary than the unknown coming from forgoing identity for 
identification and leaving the hope of a planned eschaton for an openness to the future? 
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shown. With a plethora of sects, we see more orthodox movements than we see heretical 
movements. In the earliest Christianity, the orthodox gained and retained power by 
pointing out heretical movements. Orthodoxy has often been defined by pushing off from 
heresies, by saying what orthodoxy is not, which is still true today. However, since the 
separation of church and state in many countries allows for many different sects to have 
equal or similar power, we see a multitude of powerful orthodoxies, quite unlike what we 
saw in the first five centuries C.E. 
With so many orthodoxies, some Christians are wont to identify themselves as 
heretics before an orthodox person has the chance. Today, seminary students and 
professors proudly tout the epithet “heretic” or claim a “special place in hell.” Even G. K. 
Chesterton recognized this phenomena, saying, “The word ‘heresy’ not only means no 
longer being wrong; it practically means being clear-headed and courageous. The word 
‘orthodoxy’ not only no longer means being right; it practically means being wrong” (4). 
This positive view of heresy is a sort of new orthodoxy, a play for power through 
interpellation or hailing the subject, where one first accepts the name-calling of the other 
and then uses that same pejorative name as a positive identifier (Bressler 199). 
Sometimes the oppressed uses these names as a source of power, using the power of 
interpellation for themselves (Bressler 256).15 The binary flips from orthodoxy/heresy to 
heresy/orthodoxy. Things change and they stay the same: the orthodox and the heretics 
are still both fighting for power and still from an ivory tower. 
                                                        
15
 When Bressler talks about this power shift in interpellation, he specifically references 
the use of the word “queer” in queer theory. Teresa de Lauretis coined the term to take 
the oppressive power out of the word “queer,” making it acceptable instead of 
condemnable (Bressler 256). 
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Of course, we have only a background of the deconstructing orthodoxy/heresy 
binary in ancient and modern times with its relations to voiced/voiceless and 
belief/action. It does not fit every situation, as noted, and is mythical, in the sense that is 
not reality for all situations, but rather informative for all situations. With this 
background in place, we can move on to examine the deconstruction of orthodoxy/heresy 
in the two examples of the stories of reaction to the 325 C.E. Council of Nicaea and the 
stories of reaction to William Paul Young’s fictional novel, The Shack. 
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Chapter 2: Nicaea 
When we watch the deconstruction of orthodoxy/heresy in the deconstructing of 
the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE, we observe the deconstruction of a myth. The council 
has reached mythical status in Christianity, as the interpretation of the event is as 
important as what actually happened. The event has transcended itself to become a 
symbol of Christian theology (cf. Ayres 86; Wand 21), even though the event was one 
step in part of a larger process of defining Western orthodoxy. The myth portrays the 
council as the defining moment of ecumenical orthodoxy and the Nicene Creed as a 
ubiquitous authority immediately after the council. However, orthodoxy was not created 
ex nihilo at the council. In fact, much of the council's significance was not established 
until the 451 CE Council of Chalcedon, when the creed we call “Nicene” was penned, 
capturing the spirit of Nicaea, not the letter.16 
By writing what Caputo calls a “microhistory” (WWJD? 106), we see 
interpretations other than the traditional one, ones of how struggles for identity, power, 
and truth-seeking established a Nicene “orthodoxy” in a very un-Jesus-like and, 
therefore, ungodly and unorthodox manner. The methods are an unorthodox wedding of 
church and state while the doctrines reflect an always already deconstructing concept of 
orthodoxy/heresy, of theology. The play of binaries and interpretations in the Nicene 
event, deconstruction becomes evident in orthodoxy/heresy in the Nicene Creed (451 CE) 
with the creed established at Nicaea (325 CE). 
 
 
                                                        
16
 Although penned at Chalcedon, the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon attribute the 
creed to the Council of Constantinople in 381 CE (Wilhelm). 
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2.1. The Council of Nicaea (Re)told 
Before the council, a (theological) conflict arose in Africa between bishop 
Alexander of Alexandria and one of his priests/presbyters, Arius. Some describe this 
problem and the ensuing controversy as one of christology, but Ayres rightly depicts the 
issue as one of how “the term ‘God’ could be deployed. […] In discussions of the 
relations between the Son and the Father, or between creation and generation, arguments 
about the ‘grammar’ for talking about God were also under way” (14). How we talk 
about God says a lot about what we believe concerning God, although Constantine 
thought the matter was a “very insignificant one,” at least until the council was convened 
(cf. Stiver 6; Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 2:69).  
If, like Alexander and the Gospel of John, we say Christ was God’s word and 
wisdom, then Christ “must always have been with the Father” (Ayres 16). On the other 
hand, Arius cannot talk about anything as “always” existing other than God. If only God 
is ultimate and eternal, then Christ must have been created and, therefore, is inferior to 
God.17 Both men wanted to protect their “high” christologies and theologies, Alexander 
focused on Christ’s godliness, whereas Arius singled in on God’s holiness. Both were 
protecting the same orthodoxy about God’s greatness, Alexander by envisioning a duality 
amidst God’s unity, whereas Arius saw God’s uniqueness, separate even from the divine 
child of God. 
This conflict arose at a time when church government was increasing in its 
expression of hierarchy (Todd 197-97). With hierarchy on the rise, theology was 
becoming not only the interest of the bishop, but also the responsibility of the bishop, 
                                                        
17
 More theology was at stake here, but this simplified description is more than enough 
for our purposes. For more details of the theology at stake, see Ayres 15-84. 
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although presbyters and other lower clergy were still accustomed to some theological 
freedom. When theological disagreements occurred, the myriad of leaders were leaning 
towards disputes and argument, a prime opportunity for a bishop to exercise more 
authority based on how much power he presumed (and perhaps how confident he was in 
his beliefs). Alexander was most likely concerned about theology, but more was at stake 
than just theology. Alexander's position and authority was at stake, since his opponents 
were as political and polemical as he. A growing wealth was also at stake during the 
fourth century, since the church started owning land in the third century (Todd 197). 
And so Alexander, Arius, and others met, resulting in Arius’ informal 
excommunication (he was formerly excommunicated at the council of Nicaea). Arius 
traveled East into Palestine, where he found bishops and fellow presbyters who accepted 
him and approved of his views.18 We should not be too quick to assimilate the views of 
Arius and these other Eastern bishops, though (Grant 3). It seems safe to assume Arius’ 
views of God and Christ were at least tolerated, if not similar to those in the East, but we 
should not assume Arius either made disciples or found people who all believed the same 
thing he did. Just because people accepted Arius does not mean they can be identified as 
“Arian” (Ayres 2). Those Arius-friendly bishops could simply be more inclusive than 
Alexander. Or they were working the power board. Hierarchy was not just establishing 
itself in the bishopric, but also within the Church as a whole, as evinced in the later 
canons issued at Nicaea, some of which elevated the status of various bishoprics. These 
Eastern bishops had an opportunity to promote internal conflict within the Alexandrian 
                                                        
18
 And even before Arius left, “the disputants at Alexandria sent emissaries to the bishops 
of several provinces, who accordingly ranged themselves as partisans on either side, and 
shared in the same spirit of discord” (Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 2:62). 
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church, causing other areas to look at Alexandrians with less esteem (cf. Eusebius, “Life 
of Constantine” 2:71). 
As the conflict heightened, the Eastern emperor Licinius prohibited the bishops 
from meeting, as “Such hostilities [within the church] threatened the peace and unity of 
Licinius’s empire” (Grant 3).19 Soon after, Constantine became emperor of the East and 
West, moving from his capitol in the West to Licinius’ former capitol (although we 
cannot determine what part churches played in this shift in emperial power). Constantine 
also wanted to resolve the increasing conflict within the Eastern church. He sent money, 
but “money could not buy unity” (Grant 2).20 Like Licinius, Constantine did not approve 
of the bishops meeting, at least, not on their own. Constantine sent his “church advisor,” 
the Spanish Ossius of Cordoba, with a letter to Alexander and Arius, telling them to 
“refrain from further discussions.”21  
At least, Arius and Alexander were to refrain from such debates, although conflict 
heightened (Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 2:73). However, Ossius used his privileged 
status to continue discussions, discussions excluding Arius; he met with some bishops in 
Antioch and there agreed to excommunicate the growing sect associated with Arius at a 
future council in which Constantine involved himself, the 325 CE Council of Nicaea 
(Grant 4). The Council of Nicaea was mostly decided before it ever met and the winner 
was the bishop already in power. Nicaea, “named from ‘Victory,’” proves an apt name, as 
                                                        
19
 For the narrative of this event, I borrow mostly from the history contained in Grant, 1-
3, which I found verified in other sources. 
20
 Grant writes Constantine sent money “to support the more-reliable clerics,” but does 
not name who those were and why they were more reliable than others. 
21
 Grant 3; Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 2:71. Grant identifies the letter bearer as 
Ossius, whereas Eusebius leaves the man unnamed (Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 
2:63, 73). 
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the emperor, Ossius, and Alexander were each victorious in their own way before the 
council even convened (Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 3:6). Orthodoxy and heresy were 
pre-identified with people and their beliefs. 
Then the theological battle ensued with a few hundred bishops, almost entirely 
from the East, the emperor’s advisor Ossius, and the emperor himself (Ayres 19; Payne n. 
pag.; Chadwick 175; Wand 9; cf. Eusebius, “Life of Constantine” 3:6). During the 
meeting, a few bishops presented the creeds they would recite at baptisms, creeds which 
were “the summary of the teaching given by each bishop to the catechumens,” which 
amounted to what we can call each bishop's orthodoxy (Wand 10; Grant 7). At this time, 
the church was not a singularity with a dominant orthodoxy or identity. That culture was 
still in the making at this time. 
Given this plurality of belief and expression, one cannot look at Nicaea and think 
anyone determined to settle any theological matter once and for all. The issue was as 
much about a few specific believers and authority as it was about identity, doctrine, or 
any catholic statement of belief. Ayres notes only two documented precedents for using a 
creed to define what is and is not “correct belief.” The first was in Antioch against Paul 
of Samosata in 268 CE and the pre-council meeting in Antioch a few months before 
Nicaea. These instances were used as much against individuals as they were against any 
“heresy,” and, “until the beginning of the fifth century[, …] local creeds continued to be 
used in catechesis” (Ayres 85-86). Ayres cites no evidence of these creeds impacting the 
community outside of their generation. Grant concludes, “neither in politics nor in 
religion are there any final settlements” (12). The bishops likely went into the matter at 
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Nicaea expecting a settling of power and politics dressed up as religion, unlike the 
traditional view of a battle of orthodoxy and heresy. 
Eusebius of Nicomedia was the first bishop to present his creed. He had been 
close to Licinius in geography and politics; he also approved of Arius. In fact, he once 
wrote to Alexander, asking him to restore fellowship with Arius (Grant 3). His creed was 
quickly dismissed (Grant 6). Soon after, Eusebius of Caesarea “presented what he called 
the traditional faith of his church at Caesarea” (Grant 7). Although the Caesarean 
Eusebius was also fond of Arius, his creed was much more readily accepted, perhaps 
because it was steeped in Johannine and Pauline language. Although acceptable, the 
creed still had not reached the polemic level needed to oust Arius sympathizers.22 
Constantine intervened, recommending the term “homoousios” (same substance 
or essence) be introduced into the creed, a term “already agreed upon by Ossius and 
Alexander.”23 The creed was also accepted by all but two bishops who refused to sign the 
creed, both from Africa. Afterwards, the council went on to write a set of anathemas to 
limit the creed’s interpretations. Two more bishops would not sign the anathemas, one 
being Eusebius of Nicomedia. Given all those who sympathized with Arius, it is hard to 
imagine why only two bishops did not sign the anathemas. Since language is often 
plurivocal, the creeds and anathemas may have remained ambiguous enough for some 
                                                        
22
 Following Ayres, I avoid the term “Arian” to describe contemporaries of Arius who do 
not want him excommunicated. “It is virtually impossible to identify a school of thought 
dependent on Arius’ specific theology, and certainly impossible to show that even a bare 
majority of Arians had any extensive knowledge of Arius’ writing. Arius was part of a 
wider theological trajectory; many of his ideas were opposed by others in this trajectory: 
he neither originated the trajectory nor uniquely exemplified it” (2). 
23
 Grant, 7; Eusebius, “Letter” 4. “Homoousios” implies that God the Holy Parent and 
Jesus the Son consist of the same essence. For more on usage and meaning of 
“homoousios” see discussions in Grant, 7-8 and Ayres 92-98. 
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bishops to agree with the creed. Still, questions remain as to whether those who signed 
and did not sign did so for reasons of theology or politics.24 Orthodoxy is hard to 
determine when language, interpretation, and livelihood are involved (cf. Stiver 12). 
The four non-signing bishops and Arius were formally excommunicated and an 
us/them identity was formed. The remaining bishops were left in their seats of power, 
some perhaps stretching an interpretation of the creed so as to retain a sense of integrity.25 
However, the excommunications left the identity lines between orthodoxy/heresy or 
victor/loser a bit hazy since most of the excommunicants, including the infamous Arius, 
were “readmitted” within three years after the council; “almost all the bishops 
everywhere became aware that the decisions of Nicaea were now a dead letter” (Grant 
11). Church Historian David Wright claims few people really cared for the results of 
Nicaea, but never “openly dared to attack his [their emperor, Constantine’s] beloved 
Council” (168-69). Because the emperor was involved, certain theologies were tolerated 
instead of held by some. As hierarchy within the church rose, the same situation would 
arise when any church authority was involved. 
The council continued meeting for the next few months, discussing when to 
celebrate Easter and penning various “canons or disciplinary decrees” on various issues. 
The emperor also took some time to speak on “the importance of harmony in church and 
state,” perhaps with a hint of “or else” as Constantine had just supervised a few 
excommunications (Grant, 9; for information on the canons, see Wand, 15-20). In effect, 
Constantine was associating “us” with power and “them” with suppression and silence. 
                                                        
24
 See Grant, 7-8; Ayres, 91, 98; Wand, 11-12; Payne n. pag.; Chadwick, 175. Ayres 
reproduces the creed and one anathema on page 19; cf. Eusebius, “Letter” 4-5. 
25
 Ayres says some bishops maintained a sense of subordinationism within the Nicene 
creed (91). 
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2.2. Theological Implications as Nicaea Deconstructs 
Nicaea and a form of its creed are important to many Christians today, but we 
cannot assume it always was.26 Ayres describes the Western empire as having a 
“patch[y]” knowledge of the council, and that knowledge does not imply anything 
regarding the creed; “In a context when councils were not expected to produce precise 
statements of belief, there is no reason to think that Nicaea would be remembered for its 
creed in the years which immediately followed” (Ayres 87). And why should many 
people have known about Nicaea if it was not a champion of ecumenism? If the council 
was not about determining what was and was not “orthodox” for all, then it was likely 
about establishing a certain unity within the church’s leadership in a certain area—about 
order within the emerging hierarchy. Since the bishops could not maintain a peaceful 
fellowship as they were, the emperor decided to oust some members of the larger 
community by circumscribing that specific community within theological limits.  
But, how did the emperor decide who to support, exactly? Did he follow whatever 
his advisor Ossius believed. Were his selections carefully based on who was and was not 
a supporter of Licinius. Could Constantine have followed a “theological” majority 
present at the council or within the larger empire? Did Constantine have a sincere interest 
and opinion in the matter? Were Arius sympathizers truly “heretical” compared to the 
gospel writers, Jesus, Paul, and the other apostles, and Constantine knew it? Did God 
persuade Constantine? 
Based on the excommunications, it seems the majority who attended the council 
won the day, although the majority at the council does not necessarily equal the majority 
                                                        
26
 The Nicene Creed recited today was produced at the Council of Constantinople in 381 
(Wright 174). 
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of Christians; neither can we conflate either of these majorities with any idea orthodoxy, 
because orthodoxy took longer to develop. Even the Nicene creed took a good 15 years 
until it found its way into other texts (Ayres 100). And how steep was the majority’s 
theological slant in comparison to their personal biases and political leanings and fears? 
Were they really trying to champion correct belief or were they trying to defeat their 
opponents, opponents who were theologically different from them and causing a 
disruption in the bishop’s power? If so, over a thousand years of Christians have defined 
orthodoxy not as “right belief,” but rather, “‘what we think,’ as opposed to ‘what they 
think’” (McLaren 32, original emphasis). If so, orthodoxy is more concerned with 
identity than correctness. 
When Wand narrates the event, he believes those involved are “struggl[ing] to 
define and maintain truth,” but, regardless of the purpose, Wand rightly notes it is at this 
council “that the refinements of human character can be most clearly perceived. […] and 
there is often to be seen the drama of a fight for life or at any rate for a place in the sun,” 
a perpetual anamnesis of identity, of ipseity, or selfhood (1-2). Whereas tradition looks at 
the council and sees the hand of God promoting, protecting, perpetuating, or perfecting 
what became known as orthodoxy, a different look can see, instead, a human squabble 
obsessively worried about the valid concerns of who is right and who is in power in the 
church, in the state, and in the local communities. This latter observation is reachable 
regardless of human intentions, since authorial intention does not have the last word. 
This new interpretation draws up theological implications. Whereas a traditional 
view suggests God ordained Nicaea in order to champion orthodoxy against heresy, this 
interpretation could portray God as ambivalent towards orthodoxy. Or it could imply God 
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was upholding orthodoxy while the men at Nicaea strived to become more than “names 
connected with a series of events or with a list of dates,” so they could “come alive as 
they are seen wrestling in a public debate for what they hold most dear” (Wand 2). 
Theological or anthropological, the idea of orthodoxy and heresy cannot be 
responsibly maintained at the Council of Nicaea. If one desires orthodoxy/heresy to be 
delineated by God, one finds ambiguity as to God’s involvement in Nicaea. If one thinks 
orthodoxy/heresy is defined by people, then the binary becomes nothing more than an 
oppressive power no better than the evils of the crusades. In this latter case, orthodoxy is 
removed from orthodoxy, becoming something it never claimed to be: simple power. 
Orthodoxy/heresy does not originate and become defined at Nicaea. Rather, it 
deconstructs, becoming moot. Instead of believing the original myth of Nicaea or the 
possible interplay of power, Nicaea draws the interpreter to search for God, doctrine, 
faith, justice, and an exemplar of faith and action beyond Nicaea—neither beginning nor 
ending in the council, but still including it and still interpreting it. Identity is crucified as 
orthodoxy/heresy is abandoned for a community tracing Christ (the imitatio Christi) and 
searching for the imago Dei. 
2.3. The Creed of Nicaea and the Nicene Creed 
The creed established at the Council of Nicaea reflects the deconstruction of the 
event and the interplay of orthodoxy/heresy at the event deconstruct. The creed 
established during the council is as follows: 
We believe in one God the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible 
and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten of the 
Father, that is, of the substance [ek tek ousias] of the Father, God of God, 
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light of light, true God of true God, begotten not made, of the same 
substance with the Father [homoousion to patri], through whom all things 
were made both in heaven and on earth; who for us men and our salvation 
descended, was incarnate, and was made man, suffered and rose again the 
third day, ascended into heaven and cometh to judge the living and the 
dead. And in the Holy Ghost. Those who say: There was a time when He 
was not, and He was not before He was begotten; and that He was made 
out of nothing [ek ouk onton]; or who maintain that He is of another 
hypostasis or another substance [than the Father], or that the Son of God is 
created, or mutable, or subject to change, [them] the Catholic Church 
anathematizes. (Leclercq) 
According to the traditional myth, the creed defines orthodoxy. In defining 
orthodoxy, the creed not only sets forth what “we believe,” but also what “those” others 
believe. Orthodoxy is not simply defined as what it is, but as what it is not—and with 
vehemence. It could be enough to declare what “we believe,” as the Nicene Creed later 
does, since creeds naturally set up an us/them binary. But the creed of Nicaea condemns 
heretics, making them marginal through “we believe” and then accursed through 
anathematization.27 “They” are doubly identified and doubly remembered—“an 
anamnesis of the entirely other” (Derrida, “Monolingualism” 60). The creed creates a 
common Eucharist in its very attempt to separate communion—in making an us/them, it 
misspeaks and deconstructs. 
                                                        
27
 Every council from “Nicaea to that of the Vatican” have used the word anathema to 
decry what they determine heresies (Gignac). 
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The word anathema is a loan word transliterated from Greek. Current ecclesiastic 
usage denotes a formal curse. Whereas excommunication removes a person from 
fellowship with Christians, anathema declares a person cut off from God. Joseph Gignac 
notices this distinction between the two curses beginning in the sixth century. However, 
the Nicene usage should not be confused de facto with the current ecclesiastic distinction. 
Instead, biblical uses provide a more reasonable window into the use of anathema, 
although still not ending the story on what anathema could mean during the council. 
Etymologically, an anathema connotes setting something up. Biblically, it is used 
to translate the Hebrew cherem, where things—human and otherwise—were dedicated to 
God through destruction. In the New Testament, the word adds the nuance of an oath. In 
Acts 23, some Jews want to kill Paul and refuse to eat or drink until Paul is dead. The text 
uses the verbal form of anathema: “they anathematized themselves” (Acts 23:13). In 
verse 14, the Jews reportedly anathematize themselves an anathema, using both the 
verbal and noun forms of the word. Although connoting a personal oath (“curse” in some 
translations, particularly the KJV), this usage still carries the memory of cherem, for if 
their goal is not met, they will be destroyed and be with their God. 
The remaining five uses of this word in the Greek manuscripts suggest a 
similarity with cherem without the oath or curse connotation (Rom. 9:3; 1 Cor. 12:3; 
16:22; Gal. 1:8, 9). 1 Corinthians 12:3 says no person can call Jesus anathema (anathema 
Iesoun) while having the Spirit of God. In this usage, the word is not necessarily 
negative. On the one hand, Jesus was killed and dedicated to God, but on the other hand, 
he was also resurrected. Jesus was anathema, but lives again and is no longer in a state of 
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destruction. Anathema is not pejorative, but simply not applicable to Jesus, based on a 
belief in his resurrection. 
In Romans, Paul wishes to be anathema for the sake of his people. This usage 
does not necessarily mean Paul wishes to feel the full wrath of God in place of his 
brothers or sisters. Neither is Paul definitely wishing to be transported to a sort of hell. 
Paul could be wishing for a sacrificial death in the vein of Jesus’ death. Paul might want 
to be embody Christ, to die and be resurrected, just not a resurrection exactly like Jesus’. 
Again the word proves to be not necessarily negative, since Paul asks for something good 
for his people. Although something negative might happen to Paul immediately if he 
becomes anathema, he would not necessarily be accursed forever. 
The remaining usages are used in the way the creeds use them, first by stating a 
belief and then pronouncing anathema upon those who believe or do not believe it. 
Although these usages could connote the current understanding of separation from God, 
it is a jump to superimpose today’s meaning on the earlier usages. According to the 
word’s relation to cherem, the creedal use of the word can also carry this connotation. 
The creedal anathemas ask for the ideological others—the heretics—to become holy 
through their dedication to God in death. 
If the heretics become holy through this dedication of sacred destruction, then the 
orthodox are no longer the preferred in the creed’s binary, for “to live is Christ and to die 
is gain” (Phil. 1:21). The Nicene creed creates an equality of us/them—the heretics gain 
in becoming anathematized and the orthodox have Christ in life. Both results are holy, 
both eventually end with a re-communion at a common table. The creed loses its balance 
between orthodoxy/heresy as the binary flips, turning into play as neither orthodoxy nor 
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heresy becomes preferred. The orthodox live for Christ and the heretics gain, too, 
becoming holy and set up for God. Because of anathema, the creed loses its sense of us 
against them, preferring both and, therefore, preferring neither. Anathema yields 
“anamnesis of the entirely other”—God—where the council that produce it remains 
ambivalent to that entirely other (Derrida, “Monolingualism” 60). 
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Chapter 3: William Paul Young’s The Shack 
Deconstruction occurs in other events concerning the orthodoxy/heresy binary, 
deconstruction of text and deconstruction of myth. Although myths are being constructed 
differently today, they are still created. The myth of Nicaea hid truth and abused power. 
Similar myths are being constructed about William Paul Young’s novel, The Shack, like 
the one about to be told. Some call it heretical rubbish, others call it an orthodox gift from 
God. As the binary deconstructs, it reveals a deconstructing text. 
Reactions to The Shack engage a wide variety of perspectives. The Amazing 
Grace Baptist Church of Canton, NC calls it one of “Satan’s popular books written by 
heretics” and is said to have ripped up a copy of it on Halloween night 2009 (Grizzard, 
“Book Burning 2009”; Young, “Conversation”). These strong words starkly contrast with 
the author’s own interpretation; Young says, “You’d have to be an idiot to think it isn’t a 
God thing [that the book has been so successful and influential beyond authorial 
intention]” (Young, “Keynote Speech”).28 These two statements embody two quite 
opposite approaches to the book, both engaging in a struggle for power and both likely 
motivated by a passion for God and what they think is true and right; although Young and 
Grizzard pursue different things, their approaches are similar and correlate with a 
multitude of others. Both statements represent polarities in the “microhistory” 
surrounding The Shack’s reception. 
 
 
 
                                                        
28
 During Young’s speech he said his intentions were completely limited to what his kids 
would read. Any reading beyond that audience was beyond any authorial intention.  
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3.1. The Shack: A Place for Satan’s Heretics 
Since we all read with our own eyes, Christians read books as Christians, which 
means something different for each Christian (cf. Bressler, 76-80). Some Christians read 
little other than the Bible whereas others read everything but the Bible, and, of course, a 
large variety of Christians exist between and beyond those two categories.  
The Shack is a special sort of book for Christians because it consistently includes 
explicit allusions to Christian theology and the Bible, it is theologically didactic. 
Sometimes the book reads more as a theology text book than a novel, whereas other times 
it reads more like a novel than theology. Albert Mohler says it “includes some very clear 
theology […] making some very clear theological claims,” and classifies it as “religious 
fiction” (Cf. Olson 13; Rauser 159; LifeWay, “Book Briefing”). Although genres are 
fluid categories, “religious fiction” rightly captures the way Christians approach the 
book: as something they will interact with in the ambiguous realm of theology. Christians 
can interact in theology with any book, but more Christians more easily engage 
theologically with books self-proclaimed to be in the theological discourse, like The 
Shack. Their horizons of expectation are primed for theology as they approach the book. 
When they get into the book, their expectations are not disappointed. The novel is 
a story about a man named Mack who went camping one day with his son and two 
daughters. While camping, his son nearly dies while canoeing with the oldest daughter. 
Mack plays the hero, saving his son and leaving his youngest behind at the campsite. 
Real tragedy soon overtakes the scene as Mack cannot find his youngest daughter Missy 
when he returns to the campsite, because she was kidnapped by a serial killer known for 
the terrible things he does to little girls. 
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After this incident, but prior to the tragic account in the novel, Mack gets a 
strange letter in the mailbox. The letter bears no stamp and is addressed simply to Mack 
and signed “Papa,” an epithet Mack’s wife Nan affectionately calls God. The note asks 
Mack to meet Papa at “the shack,” which Mack can only assumes means the place where 
the police found Missy’s bloody dress in the woods of the mountains (16). 
Mack decides to go to the shack and sees reality transform. As winter changes to 
summer in an instant, so does the shack turn from dilapidated to homey. Inside this shack, 
Mack finds three people who all claim to be God: a large black woman who goes by the 
name Papa, a Middle Eastern Jesus, and an Asian woman named Sarayu. The four 
interact and the novel works at teaching Mack about God as the trinity, about God’s love, 
about theodicy or the problem of evil, and about forgiveness, both of God and humanity. 
When Christians read this story, they do not know the story, but they enter the 
story prepared to read it against their sources of theology. Since authors play an 
authoritative role in many peoples’ lives, Christians and other people often engage a book 
with a little more humility than they would a person preaching on the street corner. 
Hence, Christian leaders across the world fear The Shack because they disagree with it.  
A new weapon is used in this modern battle: media and technology. Fewer fourth-
century persons were actively involved in Nicaea because they had less access to doctrine 
and doctrinal foundations such as scripture and other literature. With literacy abounding, 
more Christians can be and are involved in doctrinal debates in various ways. The Shack 
is more readable than a theology textbook, so more people are likely to pick it up. And 
anyone who has any thoughts on The Shack can post audio and video sermons, radio 
clips, and blogs on the internet. 
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The media is like a dirty arms-dealer who sells its weapons without moral 
obligation to any one army. Whereas The Shack advertises its own website in the book 
itself, as a sort of preface and afterword (4, 249, 253-54), the bookstore of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, LifeWay Christian Stores (LCS), has created a program called “Read 
With Discernment.” For some books, authors, movements, and organizations—products 
not “consistent with historical evangelical theology” (LifeWay “Discernment”)—LCS 
hands out paper warnings to their customers, or, for online shoppers, includes a small link 
on the product’s description page.  
The Shack received such a label to combat the novel’s readability and popularity. 
In this way, those in power strengthen their influence on the common people by 
influencing what people read and how they read it.29 Before readers even start The Shack, 
they will likely read the “Book Briefing,” which tells the to be wary and “read with extra 
discernment” concerning the book’s statements on the Trinity, salvation, and sin. The 
battle for interpellation gains new weapons and enlists new soldiers as time progresses. 
 
 
 
                                                        
29
 LCS’s website proclaims it is “a division of […] the Southern Baptist Convention.” 
Since the “Read With Discernment” program started in 2008, LCS has stopped selling 
some books and authors online. When I first started my research into this program on 14 
April 2009, the LCS website carried discernment warnings for The Shack, the emerging 
church movement, and popular Christian authors Rob Bell, Donald Miller, Brian 
McLaren, but did not sell anything by those authors on their website, which is true to this 
day (with the exception of a forthcoming listing for a book co-authored by Brian 
McLaren, The Justice Project, a book without a discernment warning). As of 1 Dec 2009, 
the website only carries the discernment warning for The Shack. However, an employee 
of an LCS store handed me the aforementioned “Read With Discernment” warnings and 
said the employees hand out the warnings when customers buy the books. 
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3.1.1. The Academy v. Wm. Paul Young 
These explicitly harsh critiques are found all over the internet by Joe and Jane 
Christian, popular bloggers, and even more popular Christian leaders. President of the 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Albert Mohler scathed the book in April 2008 on 
his radio program during an episode earning “an encore presentation” in May of the same 
year. He said, “I find the book deeply troubling,” apparently because it “includes 
undiluted heresy.” During the program, Mohler summarizes the book and then contrasts a 
few parts of the book with doctrines of which he is “especially fond,” to use Young’s 
language (The Shack 155). Mohler finds discord between his interpretation of The Shack 
and his interpretation of theology and the Bible; because of these, he says, “the book’s 
clever, it’s … it’s just not orthodox, it’s just not biblical Christianity.” This cleverness 
makes the book dangerous in his eyes. Not only does the book have the authority of an 
author, but it uses a cunning rhetoric to express a theology other than his own. So he 
labels it heretical and throws in as many jabs as he can in about thirty minutes. 
Mohler tries to diffuse what he sees as “a complete destruction of the 
understanding in the Scripture of the Christian trinity,” something he suspects a Christian 
will only support and endorse if they are amiss of theology, ignorant of the contents of 
the book, or congruent with Young and “the effect of the book, [which] is, indeed, deeply 
subversive of the Christian faith.” Young would agree, although his work is less 
“destruction” and more deconstruction, whether or not he would use that word. During a 
keynote speech Gardner-Webb University, Young said he “fully intended” to attack the 
idea of a hierarchy in the trinity, an idea Mohler fully supports. How apt for Mohler to 
continually use the word “deeply” during his program as Young believes he is providing 
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a “thick description” of what Mohler calls “the reality of what happened in the Bible.”30 
Mohler thinks his interpretations of “reality” and the Bible are correct, but Young sees 
himself as expanding that view, finding a contradiction between Mohler’s doctrine and 
reality, and, indeed, intentionally subverting and “opening it [theology] to its own 
future,” its future being a new conception of God and the trinity (Caputo, “WWJD?” 106; 
cf. Bressler 364). 
Neither Mohler nor Young can rise victor. Mohler’s terms “orthodox” and 
“biblical Christianity” are similarly claimed by Young, who said “the orthodoxy in the 
book” came from the early church and the Bible. When Mohler says “deeply subversive,” 
Young’s interpretation shouts, “Yes! Exactly!” in a truly deconstructive fashion. The two 
may not engage in direct dialogue, but they are struggling for power like the fourth-
century bishops. Mohler sits in a place of power, earning his living from a fame 
associated with the academy, a place some feel Young accuses as an ignoble institution 
(Young, The Shack 65-66, 91, 198; cf. Challies 6, 9). 
In a USA Today on-line review, Cathy Grossman claims fans of the novel “read 
Young’s message as saying you can just discover Jesus’ love inside yourself, turn your 
life over to him […]. No need to put in time in the pews or know theology,” a point 
Norman Geisler and Bill Roach say “is clear: […] forget your seminary training.” 
Grossman sees The Shack and Young accusing Mohler and other theologians and pastors 
of claiming to be the way to Jesus and Jesus the way to God, of not preaching, “The veil 
                                                        
30
 Again, my words, not Young’s. A “thick description” is used “to describe the 
seemingly insignificant but abundant details present in any cultural practice. By focusing 
on these details, cultural poetics critics believe they can reveal the inherent contradictory 
forces at work within a culture” (Bressler 364). 
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of the temple has been rent,” but rather renting out the space of the veil by controlling 
access and communication to God (Roth 117; cf. Young, The Shack 66). 
However, Grossman has painted a possibly fictitious picture. On the one hand, 
Young does make some harsh remarks about “theological training” in The Shack. On 65-
66, the narrator describes seminaries as a place where people become “proper authorities 
and intellects,” those who end up teaching in seminaries, writing books, and teaching in 
churches, they are those who speak with God and know about God. They emphasize 
Scripture over experience, because everyone interprets experience, but not everyone 
interprets interpretations of experience (aka, scripture); Scripture lends itself to having an 
interpretive authority. If “personal experience […] trump[s] revelation” from the Bible, 
then church and academic leaders have lost a bit of power in guiding their sheep (Geisler 
and Roach). However, Geisler and Roach only cite twenty pages of narrative they dislike 
theologically—80-100—instead of pages talking about experience and the Bible, like 65-
66 and 119. 
On the other hand, although Geisler and Roach attack The Shack for asking 
people to listen to God and not authorized interpreters of the Bible, one of the God 
characters in the book, Papa, asks the main character Mack if he remembers his seminary 
classes, a question asked inside of Geisler and Roach’s twenty-page citation. Papa asks 
this question assuming a memory of the classes would help Mack, which the narrator 
says he does not: “None of his old seminary training was helping in the least” (91). 
Things not remembered are little help in times of need. Mack may have defenestrated the 
baby with the bath water of his theological education, an action based on his poor 
experience. But the reader need not assume Young implicates all theological education. 
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Young’s narrator does implicate some theological education and his punch is aimed at 
just those educators raising a fuss. 
In the arguments between these readers—of which Young is one—orthodoxy and 
heresy turn out to be whatever the speaker believes. They claim and cite the Bible, 
experience, tradition, and reason. The onlookers find no basis to their words other than 
other words, be they biblical words or otherwise; they are built upon the sandy shores of 
interpretation, not the impossibility of rock (Matt. 7:24-27). And although their intentions 
focus on the moral, theological, and spiritual well-being of their listeners, they become 
like bickering bishops of the fourth century, trying to establish power as an authorial and 
authoritative voice in the Christian world or to re-establish their power as a reliable voice 
within the academy and church. 
3.1.2. The Church v. Wm. Paul Young 
One of the more animated critiques in this power struggle comes from Mark 
Driscoll, an author and pastor of Mars Hill Church in Washington. During a sermon 
series on Christian doctrine, Driscoll asked if some people had read the book. He quickly 
moved on, harshly entreating, “If you haven’t, don’t.” Seeing nothing in the book beyond 
the trinity, Driscoll flippantly calls it “goddess worship,” “modalism,” “graven-image-
ism,” and “heresy.”  
Chuck Colson and his crew from the popular website Break Point are less harsh, 
although their advice and critiques are similar to Driscoll’s. Colson makes a radio spot he 
subtitles “Stay Out of The Shack,” in which he says the book has merit, but not enough 
Simmons 50 
 
for anyone to read.31 Not even enough reason for Colson to pick up the book; according 
Young, Colson admitted having never read the book in an e-mail to Young 
(Conversation). 
If Colson truly neglected to read the book before recommending people to “stay 
out of The Shack,” then his power has gone awry. In conversation and during his speech 
at Gardner-Webb University, Young related a story about this sort of power in the 
church, one he was quite eager to tell. While giving a talk in Orlando, Young had his first 
and only encounter (to date) with people protesting him, his book, and his theology. 
Young went outside and was asked if he worked at the venue as he handed them water 
bottles. When Young finally expunged the mysteries of his identity, he found out none of 
the small group of protestors had read the book. The crew must have been under the 
leadership of a higher authority in their church, an authority with enough power to inspire 
people to protest something of which they had no first-hand experience. This example of 
the church reminisces of earlier times when the laity were kept ignorant of the content of 
their beliefs (often due to language barriers), but taught to follow those further along in 
the hierarchy than themselves, an attitude quite contrary to many of the values that make 
Protestants Protestant. (cf. Driscoll). 
Although The Shack takes a small part in Driscoll’s and Colson’s work, they have 
used their status to keep people from engaging with different theological possibilities. 
They are asking people not to think for themselves, but to think what they are told. This 
misuse of power may be disguised as “protection” to the people and leaders like Driscoll 
                                                        
31
 Colson says the book has merit in its message of God’s love. Another review on Break 
Point disagrees, saying “Papa […]—despite the entire premise of the book—doesn’t love 
like God” (McSherley). 
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and Colson, but disguised and misguided or not, they protect only their power and the 
money that accompanies it. 
In response, Young uses much of the same jargon to achieve a certain power so 
people will read his book. At one point during his speech at Gardner-Webb University, 
Young said, “The Shack has the orthodox position,” and he calls people “idiot[s]” if they 
do not see God at work in the current success of the novel. However, Young is not using 
this jargon to protect his power, but rather to achieve a power of influence, a subversive 
power. Much like Driscoll and Colson, Young might not hunger explicitly for power, but 
in order to proffer what he believes is truth, he needs to be listened to and in order to be 
listened to, he needs to have authority. 
But authority is not the problem. The problem lies in misusing power by keeping 
people ignorant of other options. Young has not been in power long enough to misuse his 
power much. In fact, Young even loves his theological other, even though he throws the 
occasional names at them. Instead of abundant name-calling, he gives them bottles of 
water (Young, “Keynote Speech”). Despite the amount of name-calling and presence or 
absence of acts of love, the issue of orthodoxy/heresy boils down to power, not doctrine. 
3.1.3. Books and Wm. Paul Young 
To date, two books have been written with the title, Finding God in The Shack, 
both published in 2009. Unlike those previously examined, Randal Rauser and Roger E. 
Olson praise the book, but only to a point. Olson examines The Shack as a didactic novel, 
comparing to how he interprets the Bible, enjoying the story, but “correcting” the 
theology he finds, what he calls a “theological mistake” (38). However, Olson has 
compared the “God” in The Shack to his God, the God of classical theism. The Papa-
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Jesus-Sarayu trinity is not the God many people believe in, and Olson holds The Shack 
accountable for the two trinities not being the same—a subversive inequality Young 
wants the novel to have. 
Rauser’s work is similar. More so than Olson, though, Rauser fits his reading of 
The Shack to his theology as much as possible. Rauser’s work defends Young against 
many unnamed critics, recognizing how a text can be used to support multiple 
interpretations, but only when taken out of “the context of the relevant passages as well 
as the wider testimony of” the work as a whole (52). 
Olson and Rauser represent a common way Christians read religious fiction. 
Neither author reads The Shack like a literary critic would. Instead of investing 
themselves in the book and examining themes, they look for where they agree and 
disagree with what they believe the author intended to say. Even here, they are not 
comparing The Shack with reality, but rather with an interpretation of the Bible, which is 
a collection of interpretations of reality. And in this comparison, they examine Young’s 
novel only to support themselves and “protect” the theology of the less educated, like the 
critics before them. However, unlike the critics before them, Olson and Rauser have not 
made their thoughts available to anyone with access to a computer. Olson and Rauser 
made a critique that makes them money and raises awareness of their name in the larger 
world of the Christian academy and church. 
Again, regardless of intention, the protection of orthodoxy becomes a way to 
promote the protector. These situations lead towards a preventable confusion of God with 
human authorities. If these Christian leaders truly want to promote people finding God—
in The Shack or anywhere else—they should take precautions. No one should ever find 
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themselves in a situation where they need to “wipe the face of [an authority] off the face 
of God,” a problem Young had with his missionary father (Young, “Keynote Speech”). 
And we can avoid these situations by making education available to everyone, promoting 
education and dialogue, and removing oppressive alterities from our language. Yes, even 
at the expense of lowering the cost of “Christian” education and “Christian” education 
materials, like books. 
3.2. Deconstruction at The Shack’s Door 
While deconstruction occurs outside of The Shack, similar occurrences happen 
inside. Because of the deconstruction inside the novel, readers find meanings with which 
they either agree or disagree. When recognizing the deconstruction, the polemical 
arguments become meaningless as the different meanings found in the novel deconstruct. 
Similar to how orthodoxy is claimed by most interpreters of The Shack, the text 
privileges equality over divisions such as orthodoxy and heresy as its us/them binaries 
deconstruct. Beginning in the foreword, the text sets up a special/ordinary binary. In 
describing the main character, the narrator calls him “quite ordinary, and certainly not 
anyone particularly special, except to those who truly know him. […] he is rather 
unremarkable” (9). Although Mack is so ordinary, he is very smart (11) and “In a world 
of talkers, Mack is a thinker and doer,” making him not so normal (9). Amidst the claims 
to normality, the narrator says “[Mack] is now even more different and special than he 
used to be” after a few “remarkably peculiar” years (11). 
The narrator, Willie, cannot decide whether Mack is normal or special, confused 
by appearance and reality. In addition to confusion surrounding Mack, Willie continues 
to use unstable superlatives. On page 11, he introduces the reader to “The Great Sadness” 
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(always italicized), which could be a large sadness and/or a good sadness. Sadness is not 
usually a good thing, unless thinking teleologically; if the end result of the sadness 
justifies the means, viz., pain of the sadness, then the sadness could be interpreted as 
“great” in retrospect, what Rauser calls a “greater goods theodicy” (108, original 
emphasis). Although Mack did not desire the murder of his daughter Missy, the sadness 
helped him “become one of those rare people who are totally at home in their own skin,” 
a man who has a good relationship with God, one both deep and wide (11). 
The superlatives confuse how Willie interprets The Great Sadness, again based on 
appearance/reality. While intimately close, the sadness was great in quantity, not quality. 
Years after and upon reflection, the sadness appears qualitatively good. If not for the 
sadness, there would have been no redemptive story to tell. The Great Sadness is a felix 
culpa, a happy fault. Traditionally interpreted, sins resulted in Jesus as the Christ, 
Missy’s death and the resultant sadness yielded the story of The Shack that changed the 
life of Mack, Willie, and many others who read of the place “where tragedy confronts 
eternity,” according to the book’s subtitle. 
The Shack as a redemption story typifies the Christ story. The innocent Missy dies 
and as an effect, people learn about and grow closer in a relationship with God. This 
typology is foreshadowed in the story of the Multnomah princess (27-28, 30-32). With 
this typology in triplicate—Missy, the Multnomah princess, and Jesus—the redemption 
story of Jesus becomes less special. It becomes ordinary. 
Mack’s relationship with Christ is special, as presented in the foreword and the 
encounter in The Shack. Yet, as special as it is, the narrator tells it among other stories, 
equally as special, and, therefore, equally ordinary. This superlative deconstruction again 
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happens in the story with Papa’s preference for the phrase “especially fond” (91). God is 
“especially fond” of all people and all creation. This especial fondness becomes simple 
fondness, it becomes normal and ordinary when it is for everything. The word “especial,” 
“normal” and other superlatives lose meaning in their overuse in The Shack. 
God’s love is normal. Christ is normal. Normality becomes preferred, shifting the 
binary until Papa again says “especially fond” or tells Mack, “Everything is about him 
[Jesus],” implying Jesus is more special than the Multnomah princess or Missy (95, 
original emphasis). Papa is speaking orthodoxy when she lifts Christ above other 
redemption stories, but the narrator subverts Papa with heresy, proclaiming redemption as 
normative and found in many places other than Christ. No matter what interpreters say 
about the book, they find a deconstructed meaning in dialogue about the text and even in 
the text itself, which cannot maintain a preference for orthodoxy or heresy. Neither is 
better or worse, as the superlatives used to describe them are meaningless. 
3.3. Opening The Shack’s Door and Anathematizing the Creed 
With a deconstructed orthodoxy/heresy, we see the misused power behind so-
called good intentions and care for the moral, theological, and spiritual lives of the Other, 
namely, the less educated or powerful. Instead of engaging in debate about who is right 
and wrong, deconstruction opens up the events of The Shack and Nicaea to discussion 
and cooperation. We can disagree with the propositions interprets from either document, 
but without hierarchy and all the attempts for “mastery” by name-calling and discernment 
warnings (Derrida, “Monolingualism” 39; cf. Young, The Shack 124-25, 145-46). 
Instead of shouting our arguments and boasting of our perceived rightness from 
the mountaintops, YouTube, and the blogosphere, we can learn from what others are 
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saying about Nicaea and The Shack—no person repeats either document when they 
interpret it, but rather they give their own thoughts as prompted and informed by the texts 
and thereby adding to the events (cf. Louise Rosenblatt’s of ideas of “poem” and the 
transactional experience in Bressler, 79). No one has to be a soldier in the event of 
reading and discussing, because nonviolence is a possible way to engage the Other in the 
literary experience in an interpretive community (Bressler 80, 346).  
Instead of vying for power, we can take whatever positions we are given in the 
blogosphere, the internet, and the cosmopolis, informing and being informed by all 
Others in discussion, not debate (Cobb, “Christ” 209; “Evangelism”).32 In this way, we 
open the door of The Shack and anathematize the creeds, letting the authors out of the 
texts, letting meaning out of the texts, yes, even letting ourselves and God out of the 
text—out of any text—and into our lives, what Taylor calls “the closure of the book” (7).  
Closure connotes not only closing the book, but completing and securing the 
book, which for Taylor means forgoing any formal definition of the book, because any 
book or work is more than what is bound by its cover (Taylor 77; cf. Foucault 22-23). 
The closure of the book is the deconstruction of the text—of The Shack, of the Council of 
Nicaea—and the opening of the door to new possibilities, to interpreting a book in 
community with as many readers as possible, including other books in a truly intertextual 
fashion. Without the heavy chains of orthodoxy/heresy, we can open the door, secure the 
closure of the book, and write and interpret—a text, an event, life, ourselves, God—with 
the help of God and neighbor (cf. Taylor 79). 
                                                        
32
 By “cosmopolis,” I do not mean a city with diverse cultures in it, but the world as a 
functioning, interrelated unit—as a city. 
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Chapter 4: Theology and the Wake of Impossibility: Implications of Deconstruction 
As seen in the events of Nicaea and The Shack, those touting the orthodox label 
often approach orthodoxy in unorthodox manners, inadvertently—or advertently—taking 
a god-like place in theology, a role not even God deigns to take. They step up where God 
does not, speaking into existence what is and is not correct belief, creating the logos of 
theos—creating a hierarchy in which the self supersedes all members of the trinity—and 
calling it good. Theology becomes anthropology, ego-logy, and ipseity, echoing the 
words of Alexander Pope: “Say first, of God above, or man below, / What can we reason, 
but from what we know?” (I:17-18). 
Still, talk of orthodoxy and heresy permeate the church like the smell of garbage. 
As Rauser says, “Within Christianity there are few words that cut to the quick as sharply 
as heresy” (43; original emphasis). The two appellations are fickle. A person could be 
condemned a heretic one day and hailed as orthodox the next, or vice versa, since 
“orthodoxy” is changing, which it cannot rightly do if it is truly “right belief.”  
Each time orthodoxy changes, the new leaders “label previous divergences as 
heretical and unorthodox and unchristian, leaving the impression for their descendants 
that everyone everywhere under the banner of orthodoxy has always agreed with them” 
(McLaren 33). Every time orthodoxy purported to change, it deconstructed. Not only did 
orthodoxy do something it cannot rightly do, but the orthodoxy was changed because of 
deconstruction, because those attempting to define orthodoxy (however unsuccessfully) 
thought the current definition did not reflect reality. They noted a problem in language 
and the need for change and justice (Derrida, “Deconstruction in a Nutshell” 16; cf. 
Caputo, “WWJD?” 27, 29).  
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 Today, the binary means different things to everyone who talks about them. And 
talk about them they do, whether or not they ever use the words “orthodoxy” or “heresy.” 
The binary is at the forefront every time a denomination or church splits, every time a 
person moves from one church to another, every time a denomination removes its support 
from an academy or vice versa, and every time a conversation on belief turns into an 
argument, where one person involved questions the salvation or “Christianity” of another. 
Sometimes salvation or the level of Christianity does not even have to be at stake in order 
for the issue to be one of orthodoxy and heresy, as orthodoxy/heresy can be defined to the 
smallest area of belief, or remain in broad or “generous” categories (McLaren 23-24, 28). 
Orthodoxy is an obsession and a game of power, which is not to say one should 
throw away everything labeled orthodox. All orthodox beliefs and all orthodox adherents 
are not to blame for the actions of a loud minority of orthodox persons. The council of 
Nicaea might not have proceeded in good methods, but the doctrinal conclusions are not 
necessarily wrong. Even the sponsors of the crusades might have made correct inferences 
about life, humanity, and God. 
Neither should we try to establish another orthodoxy. Orthodoxies are oppressive 
means of differentiating “us” and “them” across time and culture. We cannot help but 
hold beliefs about reality, sifting through what we deem right and wrong—our logic 
about or “logos” of reality, including God—but these beliefs can become personal 
micronarratives instead of macronarratives. And we can seek to deflate these 
micronarratives, humbly trying to deconstruct our own constructions. This sort of play 
and deconstruction gives way to implications for identity and theology, to deconstruction 
as the way of the cross. 
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4.1. Deconstruction as the Way of the Cross: Crucifixion/Resurrection 
This auto-deconstructing faith embodies the imitatio Christi, especially the 
bearing of the cross, following Christ in a life between the crucifixion and resurrection of 
the son of God—of the logos of theos, of God—which is anathema and the foolishness of 
God (1 Cor. 1:18; Deut. 21:23; cf. Culpepper 555). It is between the via dolorosa and the 
road to Emmaus where we can suffer crucifixion, but continue living, hauntologically, as 
a trace of who we were and who we were becoming. Somewhere between the cross and 
Emmaus, we make identity statements—“I” statements—but we also recognize the 
deconstruction of these statements so the process of identification continues, never 
settling in one camp like orthodoxy or heresy, but rather traces the limits of each, traces 
the limits of self, traces the hauntological identity of Christ through imitation. 
To be like Christ is to pick up his cross, “to drink the cup” of which he drank, and 
walk the way of suffering and grief he experienced on his way from Gethsemane to 
Golgotha (Matt. 20:22; Mark 10:38; John 18:11). In this imitatio Christi, we experience 
and connect to the darkness shrouding crucifixion, the darkness of dereliction when 
identity is first abandoned and the darkness caused by the hegemony blocking light to the 
Other in our experiences, ourselves, in God, and in society (Selmanovic; cf. Winquist’s 
concept of darkness as the unspoken and suppressed in Epiphanies of Darkness). This 
darkness includes drinking the cup God metaphorically handed Jesus and the cup Jesus 
offered his disciples in remembrance of him—the anamnesis, the Eucharist, the 
communion where individuals become traces of themselves, traces of Christ, and, 
therefore, traces of each other. In this imitatio Christi, we pour out ourselves on a cross, 
but gain a trace of ourselves and others on the way to Emmaus and the breaking of bread 
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and the sharing of the cup. Not only does orthodoxy/heresy deconstruct, but the orthodox 
and heretics become unified in being the body of Christ—becoming one in the way that 
Jesus and God are one (John 17:22). 
In this darkness, the suppressed meets the oppressor as the veil between them is 
torn. In the tearing of the veil, the preferred part of the binary is no longer holy and the 
structure supporting the binary is declared impotent (Culpepper 561-62). At Nicaea, the 
darkness was partly Arius and his sympathizers, but also the poor who are so often 
ignored and grouped together as agreeing with the empire and the church. Surrounding 
The Shack, that same deconstruction happens in groups like the Southern Baptist 
Convention through its associations with their LifeWay Christian Stores and their voice 
in Albert Mohler. Not all Southern Baptists believe what their leaders believe. Even those 
touting orthodoxy have a heterodoxy beneath them. Similarly, those agreeing with what 
they read in The Shack might not find in The Shack what William Paul Young, Rauser, or 
Olson find there.  
With Nicaea and The Shack, the arguers tout “right belief,” implicitly tossing their 
opponents into the darkness of heresy, the darkness of oppression. Anything tossed into 
darkness will eventually come to light, like an epiphany, as Winquist describes it (xii). 
The epiphanies flip the binary in play, which is endless unless we move beyond the 
binary into deconstruction and future possibilities in the wake of the play. Looking at 
Nicaea and The Shack, we can move beyond arguments of homoousios, the trinity, and 
inclusive or pluralist theology, realizing a haunting God of reality will never be the God 
in which we believe. Instead of obsessing over right belief at the expense of the Other, we 
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can construct our own theology with the Other, whether or not they construct the same 
theology. 
4.2. The Waking Impossibility 
As we construct not an orthodoxy, but rather a personal theology, we reach for 
correctness, but with humble faith, not prideful certainty. We expect perfection in 
belief—equality with God—is something ungraspable, but in the same breath we expect 
to take hold of it. We bind the child of the promise on top of the altar and raise the knife, 
but expect the promise to continue—a hope against hope (Romans 4:18; Caputo 45-46). 
The wake of deconstruction and theology is impossible. They cannot have a wake, 
for a wake in water implies movement and movements have beginnings, but 
deconstruction and theology have no originary events. A funerary wake implies a life, but 
deconstruction and theology exist hauntologically. There is no real assurance of life or 
death, but rather acceptance of the specters. Still, something is awakening and it is 
something new, a newborn awakening, the awakening of impossibility. 
Derrida once shivered at this new thing, but Caputo recognizes a shift in 
deconstruction from the early fear of Derrida to an affirmation of the thing that is already 
here, yet still coming—already, not yet, as the theologians call it (Derrida, “Structure, 
Sign, and Play” 293). Instead of the fear, deconstructionists look into the face of the 
future, into the womb of birthing and say, “oui oui—à l’impossible, in a great burst of 
passion for the impossible,” “a pact with the impossible” (Caputo, “Prayers and Tears” 3, 
4). 
With awakening impossibility, faith is possible. If belief could achieve orthodoxy, 
a definitive or established rightness, then there would be no room for faith. With 
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orthodoxy, faith is impossible. But when belief cannot achieve rightness or, better, when 
belief is impossible, then faith is possible (Caputo, “WWJD?” 45). And more, faith is not 
only possible, but necessary, for action requires belief, opinion, or something to take the 
place of these two, viz., faith—praxis and -doxa are contours of each other. 
With this deconstruction of belief, of orthodoxy/heresy and the awakening of 
impossibility and faith, oppression is removed from alterity. No longer do different 
beliefs create power struggles and oppression. Any us/them binary becomes part of the 
process of identification and is accompanied by recognizing the play in the binary, how 
sometimes the “I” is an “us” and other times a “them,” and, eventually, how the terms 
“us” and “them” are simply insufficient understandings of reality, because “labels […] 
tacitly impose a common identity on a diverse group, overlooking internal differences” 
(Medina 656). The “I” simply becomes an “I,” a name, a proper name, which cannot be 
translated into any language, not even the one language of the Other, the language of 
us/them. But without these labels, this us/them language, there are only proper names. 
“And understanding is no longer possible when there are only proper names, and 
understanding is no longer possible when there are no longer proper names” (Derrida, 
Des Tours de Babel 105).  
The other cannot be understood without translation, without categorizing, without 
proper metaphors, analogies, and descriptions—which we do not have, since there are 
only proper names, only self-identification, not identity. Understanding is impossible and 
leftover are faith, hope, and love (1 Cor. 13:13). Faith steps in as we reach out to embrace 
the other, which we must, hoping for the return of that embrace. We cannot engage in 
identification without community, for memory needs community. And if exactness in 
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translation is impossible, approximation and the faith to achieve the impossible is 
necessary. 
In order to live in community faithfully, we need the other and therefore love, 
another impossibility. We cannot love what we do not know and understand, yet we can 
neither know nor understand any other. So love is love of the unlovable, of enemies 
(Caputo, “WWJD?” 46; Matt. 5:44; Luke 6:27, 35). Truly, what kind of love is it that 
only loves those who deserve love (cf. Derrida, “Cosmopolitanism” 36)?  Love and 
community and interrelated concepts—forgiveness, hospitality, justice—must become 
“aneconomic,” and “incognitos of ‘the impossible’”  (respectively: Derrida, 
“Cosmpolitanism” 34; Caputo, “WWJD?” 58, original emphasis). 
On the other hand, equally important, is being heard. “They” need to hear “us” as 
much as “we” need to hear “them.” Individuals are unlabelled, untranslatable, and 
unique, each with something to offer—that is, they are normal, each one of them 
“ordinarily special” to alter Papa’s language. No experience should be deprived of access. 
Not everyone will hear each experience , but they should be accessible to any with ears to 
hear. 
Just as not everyone will hear, neither will discussion always be pleasant. When 
we hear and are heard, communities change and memories with them. When memories 
change, people change. We change. We are influenced as we influence, we lose any 
ability to grasp onto any identity, be it “Protestant” or “Christian.” The untranslatable 
proper name eludes translation by anyone, even the self, because it never settles, it “is 
bound up with difference,” or différance (Medina 657). Discussers become restless 
nomads, traces of identities, never stopping in any one identity, never understanding the 
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self, the other, the community, the cosmopolis, or God, but always reaching for that goal, 
“run[ning] in such a way as to get the prize” (1 Cor. 9:24; cf. Taylor 138). 
But with all our running, all our journeying, we are “never arriving (arriver) 
decisively at just one final destination” (Caputo, “WWJD?” 47). This denial of identity is 
similar to our denial of theology. We allow the reality of humans to deconstruct 
identifiers, so we also allow the reality of God to deconstruct a theology. Instead, we 
embrace identification and theologizing. Just as the self is a trace of identities, God 
becomes lost and found in différance. God will always be “holy and wholly other” than 
our ideas of God, will always be deconstructing our understanding of God, will always be 
beyond, or at least different from, our propositions and stories about God (Young, The 
Shack 98; cf. Aquinas 1.1.9). God was never in The Shack, the Bible, or any theology. 
God is with us, not books. The God in The Shack is not the God of The Shack. The God 
in the Bible is not the God of the Bible, is not the God of Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, 
Rebekah, Jacob, Leah, and Rachel. God is lost and found “in the infinite play of 
interpretation,” always just beyond the next unreachable star (Taylor 103; Leigh and 
Darion). 
Our theology, deconstruction, communities, discussions, worldviews, and 
identifications may not settle, but we will have love (1 Cor. 13). Embracing the aporia 
and play of theory and practice amidst orthodoxy and heresy, we partner with the other. 
Instead of calling each other orthodox or heretic, we can call them sister and brother, 
moving together to seeing the kingdom of God growing amidst humanity. 
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Afterword: Physician, Deconstruct Thyself! 
“There are even signs that deconstruction may prove, in the course of its progress, to be 
self-deconstructing, i.e. self-curing, so that those who come down with it may eventually 
find themselves diagnosed as normal once again, well and truly able to carry out the 
institution's business as usual. And if that turns out to be the case—so runs the argument 
of this paper—it will be a new and serious occasion for anxiety” (Felperin 254). 
“Deconstruction [is] a kind of passion or prayer for the impossible” (Caputo, “WWJD?” 
63).  
Left in the wake and waking of deconstruction and theology, we construct and 
deconstruct our micronarratives and those of others, constantly looking for truth, but 
always finding it just out of reach. This constant deconstruction will carry heavy impacts 
on theology and Christianity. We will no longer see Christian as something we are, but 
rather as something we are becoming, since identity and identifiers deconstruct and we 
are left only with identifying and traces. Leaving behind the appellation “Christian” is no 
easy task. Self-labeled Christian communities will either be hesitant or evangelistic 
towards those pursuing Christ outside of labels. 
Many self-labeled Christians will also be quite resistant to those who speak of 
God, Jesus, Christ, and the Holy Spirit (among other religious figures) outside of their 
tradition and beliefs. Although deconstruction of orthodoxy/heresy will lead towards 
greater community, it will also lead towards a new sort of isolation for those making the 
transition from Christian to one tracing Christ, one who is a trace of self and a trace of 
Christ. The doors of churches may close to deconstructing persons, but the door to The 
Shack—the door to God—will be opening. And with this opening and closing of doors, 
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traces will find new communities, although the person might find oneself closed to some 
communions. 
But doors have closed throughout the ages. Doors were closed in 325 CE, creating 
early orthodox/heresy binaries. Even before then, doors were opened and shut. Scholars 
often read the epistles of the New Testament as polemical works, promoting one belief 
system against another: “if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel 
contrary to what we have preached to you, he is to be [anathema]” (Gal. 1:8).  
Often discouraging, closed doors keeps one moving, walking from the cross to 
Emmaus, anathematized and consecrated to God on a journey of tracing Christ. Even 
when doors are opened, a deconstructing Christian does not rest. When Jesus followed 
Cleopas to Emmaus, he shared with the people and there eyes were opened. But their 
eyes were not just opened, their eyes brought forth newness, birth and rebirth, as implied 
by the verb dianoigo (Luke 24:31). Just when their eyes opened and recognized Jesus, 
ideas were born and the Jesus they knew “became vanished from them” (Luke 24:31, 
author’s translation). And their eyes became ripe for more births as the hauntological 
vision of Jesus disseminated new possibilities for their understanding, as evident in the 
construction of the New Testament. Every new knowledge is only a glimpse and must be 
treated as such. New knowledge is to be replaced, because when eyes are opened and 
reopened, the target vanishes, going further beyond sight. 
My argument fits the above mold. My work, too, only goes so far. I hope it births 
ideas and opens eyes just long enough to see itself, Jesus, and justice vanish. In spite of 
this hope, neither my argument nor deconstruction are needed to reach this place between 
the cross and Emmaus. Indeed, people are deconstructing binaries and moving towards 
Simmons 67 
 
love and the kingdom of God without having ever heard of deconstruction, Derrida, or 
any other postmodern philosopher. But not only do we not need my argument and 
deconstruction, we actually cannot use either my argument or deconstruction to reach the 
kingdom.  
I have presented a technical argument to which few people gain access for 
physical, intellectual, and leisure reasons. I have presented an argument against 
arguments. I ask for Christians to stop name-calling in order to love and I have tossed 
around words like “harsh” and “flippant,” doing nothing active in this paper to help the 
other, but rather to call others to them. These words are just that—words, not actions, 
albeit words about an important topic. Still, my argument begs to be deconstructed and 
replaced by something better, something with actions and words, something that will also 
be deconstructed and replaced, again and again, until love and the kingdom come and the 
impossible becomes passable. 
Currently, I am watching my words deconstruct. I am re-placing my words with 
actions, translating the jargon into something a different audience can understand, a 
diverse audience from the upper echelon at a Presbyterian church to the adults who go to 
that church to be served a meal once a week. Instead of arguing, I try to embrace others 
and it proves difficult, a change for which I am not always prepared. A change for which 
I seek help in others by hearing them and being heard by them, by communal anamnesis, 
by communal deconstruction—deconstruction or critical thinking, or criticism, or justice, 
or love. 
Whatever wake comes next or whoever’s wake comes next, I am awake and in a 
community in which I can help others and be helped by others. 
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